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Chapter 1:

Theoretical Perspectives on Sino-African Engagement

As a result of China’s global rise, with average growth rates of approximately
9% for the past three decades, scholarship pertaining to the rise of China has
flourished. Amidst China’s heightened sense of global hegemony, the rising power
has indisputably maneuvered itself closer to African states since the dawn of the
21st century. Since 2000, Chinese net trade with African states has grown from $10
billion to more than $180 billion in 2012, surpassing the United States as the
continent’s biggest trading partner.1 Moreover, outward foreign direct investment
from China to Africa has grown from $9 billion in 2000 to $62 billion in 2008.2
Simultaneously, Chinese citizens are rapidly migrating to Africa and, of the five
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Thrall, 2015, p. 1
Idem, p. 13
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million Chinese citizens estimated to be abroad, over one million of these citizens
are in Africa.3
The special relationship China has cultivated with its African counterparts is
significant insofar that China-Africa area studies is emerging as a new field of
research that merits greater attention, as argued by Monson and Rupp.4 The role
that China will play on the African continent has the potential to reshape global
power dynamics. If China is able to forge closer security, military, and political
relations with African states, extract precious resources from these countries, and
take advantage of the growing consumer market in Africa, it will constitute China’s
deepest foray into international politics outside of the East Asian region, and will be
the primary pillar of China’s “Go Global” strategy (zou chuqu zhanlue), initiated in
1999. In short, the future dynamics of Sino-African relations could reveal important
insights that indicate a slow shift in global power dynamics, and possibly the
creation of a bipolar world order, as argued by Rinehart and Glitter.5
Consequently, many scholars across a variety of disciplines, such as Shinn
and Eisenman, are attempting to unveil the unique nature of Sino-African relations,
and research covers a vast range of themes, including historical accounts of Chinese
involvement on the continent, present policy engagements between China and its
African counterparts, and the consequences of augmented Sino-African relations. 6
Most scholars engaged in Sino-African area studies are concerned with
understanding China’s motivation for such a rapid and intense engagement with
Thrall, 2015, p. 88
Monson and Rupp, 2013, p. 22
5 Rinehart and Gitter, 2015, p. 13
6 Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, p. 1-5
3
4

4

African states, as well as evaluating how Chinese policies impact African regime
stability, cultural integration, development, and state capacity. Although SinoAfrican relations are a relatively new, yet expanding, area of scholarship, there are
already intense debates concerning the nature, intentions, and implications of
Beijing’s reengagement with the continent. This chapter will first examine the three
predominant modes of understanding Sino-African relations. These are categorized
by me as: the “Chinese Imperialism” argument, the “Great Power Rivalry” argument,
and the “Economic Engagement” argument. The remainder of this chapter critically
reviews these schools of thought on Sino-African studies and their branch subtheories, illustrating the difficulty in attempting to categorize all Sino-African
engagements under just one of these theoretical approaches. This chapter also
introduces the concept of non-interference, which will be used in Chapter 2 as a new
mode of understanding Sino-African relations. One important argument of this
thesis is that if China’s non-interference policy is shown to be more than just
Communist Party rhetoric in its foreign policy, then most existing approaches to
Sino-African studies have to be seriously reconsidered. This is because the three
existing approaches (and key sub-schools within them) assume that China is
executing a grand and highly interventionist strategy, but differs in terms of the
ultimate target of China’s strategy (e.g. United States, individual African countries)
and contrast in terms of China’s underlying motivations and incentives (e.g.
economic gain, political or military power, etc.). One problem is that China never
explicitly declares a grand strategy in public nor reveals its “true,” underlying
motivations. Thus, these are most often read into what is empirically observable. By
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contrast, “non-interference” – although sometimes vague and requiring much
contextualization within a Chinese context – is a long-standing and declared policy
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1955. Indeed, utilizing comprehensive
datasets on China’s voting record in United Nations resolutions (formal, politicalinstitutional channels), of which 1,217 resolutions were read, coded, and analyzed
in Chapter 3, and the behavior of Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs) in Africa
(informal, economic channels), the two empirical chapters of this thesis illustrate
that China’s non-interference policy is surprisingly consistent in its implementation,
raising questions about existing Sino-African theoretical approaches.

Overview of Sino-African Theoretical Perspectives
To briefly summarize, leading researchers can be divided into three schools
of thought in terms of defining Sino-African relations as an example of: (1) 21st
century Chinese Imperialism, (2) Great Power Rivalry and the coming of a new cold
war in which Chinese foreign policy is governed by countering and undermining
Western policy objectives, or (3) in purely economic terms, though scholars
disagree over the benefits that accrue to African countries. Moreover, within each
school of thought, there is a group of scholars who either support or reject that
particular approach. Below, I briefly summarize each school of thought before
offering a more in depth and critical reading of the relevant literatures.

6

Chinese Imperialism
The Chinese Imperialism school of understanding Chinese actions in Africa
consists of two distinct groups of researchers. The first group of ‘imperial’ thinkers
holds that China is a rising imperial power in Africa. They argue that Beijing seeks
to establish an empire, using Africa as a peripheral region to expand Chinese
influence through political and military domination, such as incorporating members
of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in African peacekeeping operations (PKOs).
Moreover, this school of thought contends that China wishes to unleash the power of
arms deals and gifts to pariah regimes that have the potential to make African
militaries reliant upon and even dominated by Chinese economic, political, and
military policies.7 Many African states are coined as puppet governments for the
PRC based on this interpretation and China is viewed as a dominating power in
Africa. On the other hand, advocates against this imperialist argument, like Sun,
contend that China is a benign actor, engaging with African states without any
intentions of establishing a global Sino-empire.8

Great Power Rivalry
Scholars who support the claim that China is invested in a Great Power
Rivalry contend that Chinese engagements with African states should be viewed
with skepticism by Westerners based on the belief that China is intentionally
courting African elites to undermine Western global hegemony and restructure the
current world order. Great Power Rivalry differs from Chinese Imperialism in that
7
8

Thrall, 2015, p. 97
Sun, 2014, p. 2
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the ultimate object of political struggle for China is “the West” as part of a global
strategy, whereas in imperialism, it is restricted to just the African region or
individual countries. These adherents view China as a direct threat to the future
success of Western economic and political growth around the world, suggesting that
Beijing is systematically executing a foreign policy agenda to thwart Western
interests. Yet, researchers arguing against the Great Power Rivalry interpretation of
Sino-African relations firmly maintain that Chinese engagements in Africa are
wrongly framed by Westerners as fueling a Great Power Rivalry.

Economic Engagement
While both the Chinese Imperialism school and the Great Power Rivalry
school focus on Chinese strategies, motivations, and goals, the ‘Economic
Engagement’ school is equally focused on the consequences of China’s economic
actions on the continent. Researchers who both support and oppose this method of
interpretation believe that China’s augmented role in Africa is predominantly driven
by economic motives to sustain the high levels of growth China has experienced
throughout the past three decades. A point of contention within this school of
thought occurs in evaluating the consequences of Chinese economic actions in
Africa. On one side of the debate, there are researchers who interpret these
economic transactions as undermining development and primarily benefiting
corrupt elites in various African states, ultimately making weak African economies
increasingly dependent on China. This argument leads many researchers to conclude
that China is a rising neocolonial power in Africa. Contrarily, others view China’s

8

economic actions as mutually beneficial to both China and its African counterparts,
engendering development through the construction of basic infrastructure in
countries and contributing to the growing African consumer market.

Critical Review of Theoretical Perspectives
An important aspect of these three schools of understanding (Chinese
Imperialism, Great Power Rivalry, and Economic Engagement) is that scholars have
often treated them as mutually exclusive, leading researchers to adhere to only one
perspective. For instance, one may argue that China is an imperial power and try to
characterize all Sino-African engagements within the context of imperialism
whereas another scholar holds that all Sino-African engagements are part of a grand
scheme to undermine the West. A number of flaws emerge once these schools of
interpretation are considered mutually exclusive. In reality, Sino-African relations
are diverse and have different effects on different African states. Moreover, many of
the claims concerning Chinese actions in Africa are seemingly based on the
preconceived notions that one has concerning China. For instance, due to the
diversity of Sino-African engagements, it is possible for one to find evidence to
support any of the previously mentioned schools of thought.
This section identifies a number of reasons for a lack of accord in the existing
literature on Sino-African relations. First, this area of research only emerged in a
significant way in the early 2000s when China ‘reengaged’ with Africa. Prior to the
dawn of the 21st century, Sino-African relations did exist but on a much more limited
scale, especially compared to American-African relations or the vast post-colonial

9

literature on European-African relations. Additionally, there has been a tendency to
make grand conclusions that attempt to define and encompass all Sino-African
relations, but based on limited regional or country-based case studies. Thus, the
field suffers from problems of external validity in its empirical work. There are fiftyfour internationally recognized states in Africa, all of which have different methods
of conducting affairs with foreign states and China, in particular. Moreover, Chinese
provinces have a degree of autonomy in conducting foreign relations with other
sovereign states.9 Therefore, creating broad, overarching frameworks that seek to
encompass all Chinese engagements in Africa can be misleading.
By contrast, this thesis considers ‘non-interference’ as a more appropriate
overarching concept, but the difference is that non-interference is an explicit,
formal, often utilized and guiding foreign policy principle for China. Thus, there
should be a more apparent empirical footprint that can be evaluated. Furthermore,
in my review of the literature, it appears that many researchers seemingly have
predetermined

assumptions

about

China,

which

can

lead

to

incorrect

interpretations of data and other relevant information - points that I will expand
upon later in this chapter. Again, by highlighting ‘non-interference,’ this thesis
points to important evidence that runs counter to some built in assumptions about
Sino-African relations, including the idea that China possesses an active, even
aggressive, grand strategy, and that African countries are relatively passive actors,
even victims, of Chinese dominance. Finally, the secretive nature of the Communist
Party of China (CPC) and many African states can make it difficult to definitively

9

Zhimin and Junbo, 2009, p. 14

10

know the true nature of Sino-African relations and the consequences of these
interactions.

For these reasons, it is important to conduct more systematic

empirical research, which as much as possible analyzes the full population of
existing data – something that Chapter 3 attempts by examining the full population
(1,217 UN resolutions) of China’s voting record in the UN Security Council and UN
General Assembly.

Critical Review of Chinese Imperialism
The Chinese Imperialism argument is by far the weakest of the three, since
supporters generally fail to offer a clear definition of imperialism. Most subscribers
to the belief that China is an imperial power in Africa derive from Western media
outlets and various Western governments, which use stern rhetoric against the
Chinese but, in actuality, do little to address the ‘imperial threat’ of China. Other
researchers who argue that China is an imperial power, such as Tiffen 10 and
Okeowo,11 fail to define imperialism and intertwine a potential definition with their
analysis. Thus, one consistent problem that has emerged pertaining to this school of
Sino-African understanding is that researchers often fail to clearly define their
central concept of imperialism, an already politically loaded word which must be
differentiated from other concepts to have analytic utility. Part of the complexity in
defining imperialism is that there are a great deal of differing imperial theories from
a variety of political theorists such as Marx, Hobson, Schumpeter, Luxemburg, and
Angell. However, domination of lesser powers by global or regional hegemons is a
10
11

Tiffen, 2014, par. 4
Okeowo, 2013, par. 2
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key feature to these theories and will be closely associated with imperialism in this
study.
An exception to this overarching issue of not specifically defining an author’s
concept of imperialism is found within the work of Foster. 12 Foster effectively
argues that imperialism is dynamic and modern imperialism will look drastically
different form “traditional” forms of imperialism. However, Foster does not further
define the specific features of her interpretation of imperialism.13 Perhaps because
of their lack of analytical clarity, other researchers reject the interpretation that
China is an imperial power. Namely, Junbo and Frasheri,14 Alden,15 and Power et
al.,16 have argued that China is certainly not an imperial power based the fact that
China has no known unilateral fighting force on African soil.
Moreover, in attempting to draw connections between Sino-African relations
and empire-building, it would be advantageous for scholars, such as Foster and
Tiffen, to consider arguments concerning the establishment of an American empire
in Africa and, by turn, highlighting similarities and differences between Chinese and
American actions in Africa. According to Ikenberry, an empire refers to the political
domination and control of the periphery by a more powerful state.17 He further
characterizes the possibility of an ‘informal empire,’ in which the most powerful
state exerts ‘decisive influence’ within a lesser-developed country. Informal
empires, Ikenberry argues, are based upon a clear hierarchical structure that

Foster, 2015, p. 1
Ibid
14 Junbo and Frasheri, 2014, p. 138
15 Alden, 2008, p. 46
16 Power et al, 2012, p. 189
17 Ikenberry, 2004, p. 146
12
13
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subjects the periphery to the will of the center.18 In terms of Sino-African relations,
these ideals could be evaluated by scholars to better define imperialism and
determine whether China is an imperial power in Africa. Perhaps it would be
advantageous for researchers to conceptualize whether China is a neo-imperial
power, differing from traditional interpretations of imperialism.
By contrast, the complex nature of African politics is adequately captured in
Robinson and Gallagher’s interpretation of imperialism: “any theory of imperialism
grounded on the notion of a single decisive cause is too simple for the complicated
historical reality of the African partition.”19 In other words, although one may be
able to cite a specific theory of imperialism and try to apply this theory to all SinoAfrican interactions, the intricacy of African politics, let alone Sino-African politics,
is far too complex to capture within the framework of just one imperial theory.

Critical Review of a Sino-Great Power Rivalry
Those who view China’s 21st century engagements with Africa as a
calculated, Great Power Rivalry generally adhere to one of two beliefs: (1) Chinese
leaders have a grand strategy to undermine Western hegemony through deliberate
policy choices, whether to compete with American, unipolar hegemony or to oppose
Western hegemony more generally or (2) the West wants to undermine China’s
global rise and is falsely portraying China has a belligerent actor in Africa. The
former perspective holds that China is deliberately executing a policy that is entirely
based on undermining Western policy goals, using Africa as a pawn in its strategy.
18
19
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The latter argument relies on the assumption that China is simply responding to
Western accusations, attempting to project an image as a benevolent leader of the
developing world. Nonetheless, both perspectives rely on the assumption that the
object of China’s power is the West, not domination over African states, as in the
imperialism understanding.
It is imperative to keep in mind that many political, military, and cultural
dimensions of China’s interactions with Africa have been interpreted through the
lens of Great Power Rivalry, upon which I will further elaborate, but they could
equally be considered Chinese Imperialism also. Certainly a lack of clarity in
defining and applying imperialist arguments to Sino-African relations has muddied
the ability to clearly categorize some dimensions of Chinese engagements with
African states, leading some researchers to use evidence to strengthen their claims
when, in reality, the evidence could be interpreted as falling under different modes
of understanding Sino-African relations.
Scholars who contend that China is executing a calculated policy agenda to
undermine Western hegemony primarily include Rinehart and Gitter 20 and
O’Rourke.21 According to these researchers, China does want to expand its influence
at the expense of Western powers around the world. O’Rouke draws upon Chinese
efforts to stabilize anti-Western states, such as Zimbabwe, Libya, and the Sudan,
through enormous aid, both monetary and in the form of military arms. 22 In fact,
China sent military equipment to Qaddafi during the 2011 Libyan Civil War.23 For
Rinehart and Gitter, 2015, p. 6
O’Rouke, 2015, p. 9
22 Idem, p. 12
23 Thrall, 2015, p. 32
20
21
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O’Rouke, the fact that China circumvents Western sanctions is significant enough to
illustrate that China wants to thwart Western hegemony in the international
arena.24 Others argue that China’s diplomatic intervention during civil unrest within
Sudan, without initially including Western powers, also illustrates China’s desire to
act in its own interests, continuing to purposely exclude and even undermine
Western influence in Africa.25
Rinehart and Gitter believe that China is beginning to militarize the continent
to supersede US military power and objectives within Africa.26 They cite that China
has tactically begun to increase its military presence in Africa in a number of ways.
First, China is investing more PLA peacekeepers to UN peacekeeping operations in
Africa than any other state. Second, although China has no military bases in Africa,
the PLA Navy (PLAN) has naval vessels off parts of the African coasts and has used
them to evacuate Chinese citizens from conflict zones.27 Rinehart and Gitter also
claim that China is using Africa as a training ground for PLA troops in an effort to
expand its military operations around the globe. The PLA has not fought in a ground
war in over three decades and Rinehart and Gitter contend that China’s new policy
of contributing to combat forces in UN operations is a way to expose PLA troops to
real military exercises.28 Arguing that China is deliberately attempting to undermine
Western growth and power dynamics is, inevitably, difficult to prove because China
has, and probably never will, admit to doing so regardless of its validity.

O’Rouke, 2015, p. 22
Idem, p. 16
26 Rinehart and Gitter, 2015, p. 13
27 Thrall, 2015, p. 10
28 Rinehart and Gitter, 2015, p. 14
24
25
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A number of researchers, conversely, have concluded that China is not
executing a plan to purposely undermine great powers, despite the fact that China’s
rise inevitably impacts power relations in the international arena. Shinn depicts
China’s engagement with Africa in a perspective of US unipolarity and Western
dominance in multilateral forums.29 He holds that Sino-African relations, despite
being motivated by pragmatic political or economic reasons, inherently impact US
hegemony. For instance, Shinn and Eisenman30 and Puska31 emphasize China’s “One
China” policy, in which China only invests in states that officially recognize Beijing
and not Taipei. This policy has resulted in the growth of Chinese ‘yuan diplomacy,’ in
which China gives out loans and aid projects to its political allies who do not
recognize Taiwanese sovereignty.
Two aspects of the One China policy are important in understanding the
impact of Sino-African relations in a Great Power Rivalry perspective. First, Chinese
“aid for trade” projects in Africa, low interest loans, and a lack of conditions on
monetary aid for political allies predictably influences African elites to continue
having positive relations with China, as argued by Thrall32 and Shambaugh,33 who
believe that Beijing uses monetary incentives, such as low interest loans, to
undermine the ability of Western powers to influence the domestic policies of
recipient states.34 Thus, China has been able to rely upon the ‘African bloc’ to

Shinn, 2009, p. 44
Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, p. 237
31 Puska, 2008, p. 26
32 Thrall, 2015, p. 89
33 Shambaugh, 2013, p. 101
34 Idem, p. 253
29
30
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increase its influence in international forums, such as the United Nations and World
Trade Organisation, posing a power rivalry to Western states.
Second, China’s desire to court African leaders has led to China creating its
own forums and relationships with multilateral organizations, of which China is not
a member. For instance, Shinn and Eisenman35 examine how China’s relationship
with the African Union (AU), which China built a $200 million headquarters for in
Addis Ababa, and the creation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC),
China’s primary method of conducting affairs with African leaders, has fostered a
great deal of African support for China. An example of China’s augmented prestige in
the AU is the election of African Union Commission Chairperson, Jean Ping, who is
half Chinese.36 The United States and other Western powers are excluded from
many of these multilateral forums, such as FOCAC. 37 Essentially, since China
reinvigorated its relations with African states, its desire to find political allies and
peacefully engage with the continent does have clear implications for Western
hegemons.
Moreover, Enuka38 and Nesbitt39 argue that Beijing’s arms deals with violent
pariah regimes and the construction of Chinese-funded, light arms weapons
factories for African leaders, which often circumvents Western-imposed sanctions,
have been cited as fueling a Great Power Rivalry, in which African militaries rely on
Chinese weapons to succeed. Brown and Siram,40 Enuka,41 and Thrall42 include an

Shinn and Eisenman, 2013, p. 366
Idem, p. 368
37 Ibid
38 Enuka, 2011, p. 18
39 Nesbitt, 2011, p. 3
40 Brown and Siram, 2008, p. 256-257
35
36
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instance when China was notoriously criticized for selling arms to both Khartoum’s
forces as well as militant rebel groups in the Sudan’s western and southern
provinces, attempting to illustrate that China is actively seeking ways in which
African militaries can become proxies for Beijing.
Other researchers argue that China’s recent relations with African states are
based on China’s desire to be viewed as a benevolent leader and responsible
stakeholder for the developing world. Taylor,43 Thrall,44 and Shambaugh45 contest
that China’s motivation to be viewed as a cooperative leader for developing states is
a reaction of the Western media portraying China as a negative influence on African
governments and democracy, especially since the 1989 Tiananmen Square
protests.46 Some view the expansion of Chinese soft power in Africa as a counter to
the West’s false assertion that China is a global threat. Anshan47 as well as Hanauer
and Morris48 discuss how Chinese medical aid to Africa has been a major source of
Sino-soft power politics. Similar to Médecines Sans Frontièrs, Chinese medical
teams have been dispatched throughout the continent to train doctors, help
patients, conduct research, and introduce traditional Chinese treatments to African
doctors. Shinn and Eisenman49 include that between 1963 and 2005 more than
15,000 Chinese medical personnel have been dispatched to 47 African states. Soft

Enuka, 2011, p. 18
Thrall, 2015, p. 94
43 Taylor, 2004, p. 23
44 Thrall, 2015, p. 77
45 Shambaugh, 2013, p. 96
46 Idem, p. 19
47 Ashnan, 2009, p. 9
48 Hanauer and Morris, 2014, p. 79
49 Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, p. 151
41
42
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power, in the form of medical aid to African states, has allowed China to try and
oppose Western claims that China is an irresponsible stakeholder in Africa.
He Wenping mentions that “Africa is perhaps the most important testing
ground for the promotion of Chinese soft power,” depicting the importance of Africa
in fostering China’s soft power expansion, especially in the media.50 Rather than
interpreting soft power projection as a form of cultural imperialism, He,51 Shinn and
Eisenman,52 King,53 and Jaques54 hold that the main objective of Chinese soft power
in Africa is to uphold its image as a positive developer despite Western accusations
arguing the contrary.
The importance of soft power and the media in projecting Chinese power
abroad, as shared by these authors, includes the fact that Xinhua, China’s largest
state-run news broadcaster, is currently Africa’s largest single news agency.
Moreover, China Radio International (CRI) and China Central Television (CCTV)
broadcast throughout the continent. Since the 1980s, Xinhua news wires are free for
all Africans who can access it but cannot afford to pay.55 Most importantly, Xinhua
will often hold workshops and write editorials for African newspapers in an effort to
depict China as a benevolent developing partner on the continent. Unlike Western
media outlets on the continent, most Xinhua’s stories in Africa are not defamatory
towards the West. Instead, Chinese state media outlets seek to increase China’s
prestige

and

reputation

without

actively

undermining

Western

media

He, 2009, p. 115
Ibid
52 Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, p. 214-215
53 King, 2013, p. 177
54 Jaques, 2009, p. 399
55 Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, p. 202-204
50
51
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organizations.56 Soft power in the form of media is important to the Great Power
Rivalry struggle due to the influence wielded by the media. The rapid expansion of
Xinhua, CRI, and CCTV throughout Africa, as well as the generally positive reception
of Chinese media by African leaders, illustrates that Chinese media outlets are
competing against the influence of Western media sources in Africa.
Finally, Confucius Institutes (CIs) and Chinese cultural exchange programs
with African states are perhaps the greatest representations of China’s soft power
and its impact on a potential Great Power Rivalry, according to King57 and Yang.58
Kurlantzick states that CIs are ‘reminiscent’ of the British Council and Alliance
Française, making their scope and expansion significant.59 China’s Office of Chinese
Language Council International (Hanban) uses CIs as a way to facilitate a greater
local understanding of China’s culture, language, and increase its global prestige.
Additionally, the 2003 Addis Ababa Action Plan, according to Shinn and Eisenman,
has fostered cultural exchange programs between China and most African states and
continues today.60
It appears, according to the previously mentioned authors, that China’s soft
power projection in Africa, especially through CIs, is being perceived as being
motivated by Western accusations of negativity towards China. Therefore,
successful cultural exchange programs and the growth of CIs are a way for the
Chinese to pursue a positive reputation in Africa and, consequently, gain influence in

Shambaugh, 2013, p. 101
King, 2013, p. 180
58 Yang, 2010, p. 238
59 Kurlantzick, 2009, p. 69
60 Shinn and Eisenman, 2012, p. 266
56
57
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the continent. Power et al.61 and King62 contend that one of China’s greatest benefits
from the expansion of soft power in Africa was the African bloc’s backing of China in
the Olympic bid process, resulting in Beijing hosting the 2008 Olympic Games.63

Economic Engagement
A third argument for understanding Sino-Africa relations is that of purely
economic motivations and their consequences for African states. In essence, these
authors believe that China needs resources to sustain high economic growth and
Africa has the necessary resources to foster Chinese development. One fundamental
difference exists between the interpretation Sino-African economic engagements.
The first holds that China is promoting sustainable development for Africa, thus
establishing mutually beneficial relations. The second division suggests that SinoAfrican economic deals favor Beijing and ultimately undermine African
development, in which China is accused of being a neocolonial power engaged in
unequal relationships. This ideal suggests that African states, the periphery, are
dependent upon Chinese money, resources, and technology to make significant
gains.64 One shortcoming of Sino-African economic research is a lack of reliable data
due to issues of corruption, transparency, and illicit economic activities conducted
by companies, often deeply connected to Chinese and African states. Another
potential issue with this view is that China has only been Africa’s largest economic

Power et al., 2012, p. 98
King, 2013, p. 180
63 Power et al, 2012, p. 192
64 Enuka, 2011, p. 50
61
62
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partner since 2009, and the long-term impacts of Chinese economic maneuvers in
Africa are yet to be fully seen.
Enuka

65

and Nesbitt

66

firmly perceive China’s augmented economic

relationship with Africa as neocolonial, resulting in negative developmental impacts
to African states for a number of reasons. Because Chinese aid comes with no
conditions, it often ends up in the hands of corrupt officials who use the money for
their own use or use foreign aid to undermine legitimate opposition groups. Many
African leaders, therefore, are reliant upon Chinese funds to stay in power and
increase their own personal wealth – a dependency that China can use to its own
advantage. Moreover, many believe that medium and small Chinese, privately
owned businesses are taking jobs away from indigenous Africans despite the fact
that many African consumers are dependent upon Chinese businesses to provide
goods to the market at a cheap price. Although many of the nearly one million
Chinese citizens living in Africa are unskilled and poorly educated, their connections
with manufactures in China are more extensive than that of African businessmen
and women. Thus, it is possible for Chinese businesses to import Chinese products
and sell them in African markets cheaper than it costs to produce the product within
Africa.67
Illicit activities by Chinese nationals have also plagued China’s economic
relationship with many Africans. Poor working conditions, labor rights violations,
low wages, and illicit mining and trade on the black market for items such as ivory

Enuka, 2011, p. 22
Nesbitt, 2011, p. 2
67 Idem, p. 15
65
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are just a few of the many grievances some Africans have expressed regarding
China’s economic policy on the continent, according to Hanauer and Morris, 68
Kurlantzick,69 and Thrall.70 Nonetheless, many African economies dependent upon
the Chinese extractive industry and these labor violations and poor conditions
continue to endure. Already, four democratic countries, Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, and
Benin, have passed laws restricting how many Chinese citizens could enter the
country and open their own businesses, illustrating the dissatisfaction some
Africans are beginning to feel towards Chinese citizens in their country.71
Mol’s incorporation of the World’s System Theory, a theory first discussed by
Immanuel Wallerstein72 to Sino-African relations, asserts that an ‘environmentally
unequal exchange’ exists between ascending world powers and peripheral regions.
For Mol, this indicates that China is not a partner in African development, but rather
an expanding neocolonial power.73 Mol,74 Thrall,75 and Shinn and Eisenman76 have
cited instances of the Chinese moving environmentally hazardous industries from
China to Africa, where environmental regulations in some states are more laid back,
taking advantage of African laborers and resources to unilaterally further Chinese.
Zambian copper mines, for example, have been prone to environmental exploitation
by Chinese SOEs, potentially explaining why anti-Chinese sentiments are so strong
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in Zambia, according to Hare.77 In general, these scholars hold that an inherently
unequal economic reality exists in which some countries, in this case China, benefit
at the cost of nearly powerless peripheral states, Africa.
By contrast, some argue that Chinese economic engagements with
underdeveloped African states will stimulate mutually beneficial growth for both
China and its economic partners in Africa. These authors cite the fact that China
gives more aid to African states than any other country and its policy of no
conditions makes aid more readily available to recipients than loans from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and Western industrial powers.
For instance, Shinn and Eisenman cite that following Sierra Leone’s bloody civil war,
President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf stated that it was crucial for the international
community to quickly help rebuild roads to foster economic growth and peace
building measures in her country.78 Western aid mechanisms took too long to reach
a consensus on the conditions attached to the aid. Thus, China was able to efficiently
send an aid package to Liberia as Western powers struggled to agree on what an aid
package should constitute. King 79 and Ramo 80 contend that China’s aid and
development policies are forming a Beijing Consensus, providing an alternative to
the Western-led, Washington Consensus.81
In light of such sparse data, Strauss relies on ethnographic studies and
concludes that China has positively contributed to African development. Strauss
acknowledges that Chinese loans have made it possible for African states to produce
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foundational infrastructure necessary to engender future industrialization. 82
Strauss,83 as well as Foster et al.,84 discuss Chinese funded construction projects that
have resulted in new harbors, roads, electrical grids, water treatment centers, oil
refineries, and, most well known, the TAMZAM Railway.
Still, other scholars, particularly Alden 85 and Park, 86 recognize that it is
difficult to categorize all Chinese economic investments in Africa as either
contributing to economic growth or taking advantage of an already weak African
economic structure. Park’s ethnographic research in Lesotho and South Africa
contends that South Africans generally believe that Chinese investors and small
business owners are ‘filling gaps’ in the economy and contributing to economic
gains rather than taking away opportunities from South Africans.87 On the contrary,
Park found that in Lesotho, people view Chinese investors as hostile foreigners who
are opening businesses and taking jobs from the indigenous population (due to the
cheap manufacturing costs in shipping goods from China to Africa).88 Alden also
reaches a similar conclusion of economic complexity. He sees similarities between
Sino-African economic relations and the ‘Flying Geese’ development model of East
Asia, in which Japan, an industrialized power in the region, led the way for economic
development in the region. Alden recognizes the influx of Chinese investment and
the potential for it to help other African states maintain growth rates similar to
China. On the contrary, Alden also believes that Chinese investments are not
Stauss, 2013, p. 163
Ibid
84 Foster et. al, 2009, p. 86-134
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significantly diversifying African economies and much of the aid China gives to
Africa ends up in the hands of pariah regimes.89
Mommsen’s

concept

of

developmental

neocolonialism

holds

that

disproportionate economic relations and developmental aid to weaker states results
in those states becoming so reliant upon the donor state that a neocolonial
dependency emerges. This developmental neocolonial interpretation further
contends that the center, in this case China, extracts natural resources from a
dependent states while simultaneously exporting goods and capital to the lesserdeveloped state on unfavorable terms for that client state.90 In a context of SinoAfrican relations, one could consider Chinese development aid, resource extraction
from pariah regimes, and selling Chinese goods in African markets, which many
times undermines indigenous businesses, as having elements of this interpretation
of neocolonialism.

Concluding Remarks
Sino-African relations are clearly complex and, despite the existing
theoretical modes of understanding these often difficult relations, scholars cannot
singularly agree on the best way to characterize China’s reengagement with Africa
in the 21st century. This chapter has defined the major schools of interpreting SinoAfrican relations, outlining the various flaws in these schools of understanding. Due
to the intricacy of Chinese actions in Africa, the following chapter provides a
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different lens, that of China’s non-interference policy, by which Sino-African
relations can be better understood and explained.
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Chapter 2:

Non-Interference & Reconceptualizing Sino-African Engagements

Introduction
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the current Sino-African literature is
that there is a great deal of conversation within each school of interpretation but a
surprising lack of communication amongst these schools of thought. This lack of
communication has resulted in researchers attempting to categorize all Sino-African
engagements into one school of thought, largely ignoring the diverse nature of
Chinese foreign policy. One important goal of this thesis is to take China’s declared
policy goals, strategies, and motivations seriously and study whether it is simply
political rhetoric, or acts as a true guiding principle for China when engaging with
Africa.
Clearly, if China truly abides by the spirit of non-interference, then this may
undercut many of the aforementioned theories, including neo-imperialism, Great
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Power Rivalry, and possibly even neocolonialism. This is true because the three
schools of thought regarding Sino-African affairs assume that Beijing has a grand
strategy to intervene in Africa to build an empire, compete against the West, or
make African economies and leaders dependent upon Chinese policies, knowledge,
aid, and technology to expand. Thus, if Beijing closely adheres to its noninterference policy, which is generally based on peaceful coexistence, mutually
beneficial relations, and not meddling in another state’s domestic policies, these
elements of non-interference run counter to arguments that China is an imperial
power, using Africa as a proxy to wage a Great Power Rivalry, or a neocolonial
presence in African. All three of these schools of thought suggest some sort of
interference in African politics for Beijing to succeed.
However, I argue that using China’s policy of non-interference as a mode of
understanding Sino-African engagements provides greater insight into the true
nature of this complex relationship and can help explain China’s justifications for its
diverse actions in Africa. One goal of this chapter is to show the legitimacy behind
China’s non-interference policy, ultimately showing that this policy should not only
be taken seriously, but should be considered by other Sino-African researchers
when attempting to categorize and interpret Chinese actions in Africa.

Non-interference Policy
Beijing has used a policy of non-interference as its guiding principle when
interacting with other states since the 1955 Bandung Conference, in which Chinese
delegate, Chou En-Lai, Indian Prime Minister Nehru, and Burmese Prime Minister U
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Nu agreed upon 5 Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (5 Principles). The 5 Principles
are: (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2)
mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in each other’s affairs, (4)
equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful co-existence.91 These
ideals are the basis for China’s policy of non-interference. However, the guidelines of
the 5 Principles are very general and, therefore, Beijing has been able to reinterpret
its non-interference policy over the decades to suite the current needs of the CPC.
This chapter will evaluate five key elements that often are used to define
Sino-African relations: pariah regimes, Beijing’s “One China” policy, Chinese
involvement in multilateral forums, aid non-conditionality as well as trade
imbalances, and Beijing’s soft power projection. These five dimensions of SinoAfrican relations are perhaps the most contentious and widely used by theorists
adhering to all three schools, and their sub-categories, of understanding SinoAfrican relations. By analyzing these topics through China’s non-interference policy,
this chapter illustrates Beijing’s justifications for its diverse foreign policy acts in
Africa, which the CPC considers to be in accordance with the 5 Principles. Ultimately,
this Chapter will show that researchers should take China’s non-interference policy
seriously as a way to better understand Sino-African engagements than the three
predominant schools of thought. Additionally, this chapter illustrates how authors
adhering to multiple modes of interpretation often use these various dimensions of
Sino-African relations to uphold their argument, indicating that it is exceedingly
difficult to characterize these elements into one single mode of interpretation.
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Before beginning, however, it is important to point out that ‘noninterference’ does not mean ‘non-engagement.’ The latter is an isolationist idea,
which clearly is not China’s intent in Sino-African relations. Rather, ‘noninterference’ has more to do with respecting and protecting the sovereign integrity
of countries China engages with, and it generally favors the existing or ruling
governing party. Thus, it is a conservative, status quo approach to bilateral relations.
This can be quite amorphous too, and China defines it in certain ways, as illustrated
below through the five examples.

Pariah Regimes
China’s relationship with authoritarian, pariah regimes has been a point of
contention when determining how to interpret Sino-African relations. Zimbabwe,
Qaddafi’s Libya, Sudan, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are key
economic and political allies for Beijing in Africa. China has upheld these regimes
with monetary aid gifts, arms deals, circumventing Western-imposed sanctions
regimes through trade agreements, and even constructing weapon-manufacturing
factories for the Sudanese and Angolan government at Chinese expense.92 However
China seemingly views its relationship with African states as being consistent with
its non-interference policy.93 In other words, China claims that it seeks to not
interfere with the domestic politics of another country and, as a result, remains
neutral, apolitical, and largely engages with other states in purely economic terms.
Chinese arms deals with pariah regimes and circumventing Western imposed
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sanctions, which O’Rourke largely criticizes as the most apparent method of China
working to counter Western hegemony, is interpreted by Chinese officials as falling
under the policy of non-interference because China does not want to involve itself
with the domestic politics of another state.94 Thus, selling arms to the Sudanese
government and Sudanese rebel forces during the Darfur genocide was justified by
the CPC as remaining apolitical and simply making economic transactions through
arms deals rather than attempting to pressure Khartoum through sanctions.95
Nonetheless, Rinehart and Gitter 96 and O’Rourke 97 believe that China is
intentionally executing a systematic agenda to undermine Western expansion
(Great Power Rivalry) and restructure the current world order so that China can
become the unipolar global power, using its relationship with pariah regimes as a
means to achieve this end. Because many of these pariah regimes hold hostile views
towards the West, the fact that China is providing a sense of elite stability, through
money and arms, leads some to assume that Beijing is rallying as many anti-Western
states to its side as possible to undermine Western influence in international
forums, such as the UN. Moreover, the isolation that many of these states face has
made them arguably reliant on Chinese monetary funds and arms deals to stay in
power (neocolonial).98
China’s relationship with African pariah regimes is also scrutinized for
undermining development given the deplorable human rights record and high levels
of corruption that plague many African states. Adherents of this belief contend that
94
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China is allowing pariah regimes to continue bad governance practices with few
consequences; African elites can therefore continue ruthless practices with Chinese
funding.
On the other hand, sanctions can be detrimental to civilian populations and,
despite largely not knowing how Chinese aid is used, Beijing is providing these
states with aid projects.99 Moreover, those who believe that Chinese engagements
with African states are generally positive suggest that China’s close relationship
with many pariah regimes has helped resolve conflicts such as the Sudan-South
Sudan crisis. As Sudan and South Sudan fought over natural resources in disputed
territories, Chinese officials helped the two sides reach an agreement and even
negotiated with Khartoum to allow a UN peacekeeping operation, the United
Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), to enter its border and foster greater
stability in the region.100

“One China” Policy
Beijing’s “One China” policy is one of the CPC’s guiding foreign policy
doctrines. Through the policy, China states that it will only hold diplomatic relations
with states that recognize Beijing rather than Taipei.101 China justifies this policy in
terms of non-interference. Although one could argue that Beijing’s One China policy
is a form of interfering with a country’s domestic politics by pressuring that state to
recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the Republic of China (ROC),
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the CPC holds that this policy is by no means a violation of a state’s sovereignty. The
CPC interprets the “Taiwan issue” as its own domestic policy. Thus, if a state chooses
to recognize Taiwan and defend Taiwanese independence, Beijing argues that that
state is inherently interfering in China’s domestic politics and, therefore, interfering
with China’s domestic affairs. The consequences of this policy have been received
differently by many scholars and illustrate the inability to define even just this
aspect of Chinese foreign policy within one school of interpretation. In fact, Beijing’s
One China policy is often used by researchers within all three schools of
understanding Chinese actions in Africa, depicting the complexity of Sino-African
relations.
Much of the PRC’s and ROC’s efforts to win political support and recognition
from other states has taken the form of ‘dollar diplomacy,’ in which aid projects,
monetary gifts, and favorable terms of trade and investment are given to states in
return for their recognition. Some argue that this relationship is mutually beneficial
because Beijing may receive recognition from another state and, in return, helps to
develop the infrastructure of and invest in that state. 102
Conversely, African states that are heavily dependent upon Chinese
investments and its ‘yuan diplomacy’ practices, such as South Africa, are politically
restricted from changing their official recognition (neocolonialism). For instance,
following the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the new government
desired to recognize both Beijing and Taiwan, a clear violation of the CPC’s One
China policy. As a result, China threatened to withdraw its investments in the South
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African economy, cut its aid and low interest loans to the country, and sever
diplomatic ties between the two states. Ultimately, South Africa only recognized
Beijing in the fear that China pulling its investments would shatter its economy and
cripple its development efforts.103 This instance has been interpreted by adherents
of the neocolonial argument grounded in the fact that South Africa was so
dependent on Beijing’s economic involvement in the country that it was unable to
make policy decisions for itself without facing imminent economic turmoil. In
essence, China exerted political control over the South African government in terms
of the Beijing-Taipei issue due to South Africa’s dependency on Chinese economic
engagements. There is concern that China could threaten similar consequences for
states that disagree with current and future territorial claims made by the Chinese.
Perhaps this is why many African states have refrained from scrutinizing Beijing
over its territorial expansion in the South China Sea.
Furthermore, some interpret the One China policy as fueling a Great Power
Rivalry. Taiwan has long been a US geostrategic island that receives arms deals from
the United States. 104 Therefore, courting countries to stop recognizing Taiwan
inherently takes away influence that the United States has in East Asia and isolates
Taiwan from legitimate involvement in many international forums. Beijing’s ability
to gain international favor over Taipei, resulting in the Beijing replacing Taiwan in
the UN in 1971, especially fuels what some consider to be a Great Power Rivalry.
The US voted against Beijing replacing Taiwan in the UN, taking the particularly
important UN Security Council P-5 seat, illustrating that the US lost a key ally in the
103
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Security Council. 105 Thus, as Beijing continues to court other states to switch
recognition, it becomes increasingly difficult for the US to recognize and propagate
an autonomous Taiwan, constraining US ability to pursue this stance that has been
undermined by decades of Chinese efforts.

Multilateralism and Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations
China’s invigorated efforts to join with and establish new multilateral forums
and UN PKOs, when viewed in a context of non-interference, further illustrates that
the current methods of interpreting Sino-African relations are not mutually
exclusive. The establishment of multilateral institutions, FOCAC, provides the CPC
with forums in which it can discuss current affairs and international policies
without violating the territorial sovereignty of a state (non-interference).106 If China
were to solely pursue bilateral relations with smaller, weaker African states, it may
appear that the CPC is coercing these states into pursuing Chinese interests through
uneven bilateral discussions, which would undermine China’s policy of mutual
benefits and equality. However, multilateral forums provide the CPC with a sense of
legitimacy, backed by its promise of non-interference, in state-to-state relations. Due
to the fact that a great number of African states willingly send delegates to these
multilateral forums, it is more difficult for Sino-critics to single out China as
diplomatically coercing these states in pursuing policies that favor Beijing,
especially given that all states have equal rights and are at a more level playing field
within these forums.
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Some argue that China’s increased involvement in these organizations, such
as the WTO, as well as the establishment of new forums, proves that Beijing wants
to ‘play by the rules’ of the international community and become an active
participant in world affairs. 107 This interpretation of Chinese multilateralism,
therefore, is used by some to contend that China is, by no means, seeking to
undermine Western hegemony given the fact that the CPC has joined international
institutions that require it to abide by a particular set of regulations. Conversely,
others point to how the CPC has acted, once a member of multilateral forums, and
argue that there is a Great Power Rivalry at play. The clearest example of this can be
seen in how China has acted in the Human Rights Council (HRC). China has
incorporated its multilateral policy and non-interference to shield itself from
criticism concerning human rights violations and political freedom. The CPC adheres
to a belief that each state has a different understanding of human rights and
governing. It is a violation of that state’s domestic policy and a breach of noninterference policy, therefore, to punish a state for governing a certain way or
interpreting human rights differently than another state. In essence, China promotes
an ideology that each developing state, based on its unique cultural norms and
domestic politics, has its own way of developing and Western conceptions of human
rights and ‘good’ governance should not be imposed upon other states.108
For this reason, China justifies blocking Western sanctions regimes based on
human rights violations and governance structures in the name of non-interference.
More importantly, China’s ability to frame human rights and governance structures
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as part of a country’s domestic policy has protected Beijing from similar criticisms
and repercussions. Since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, China has rallied
developing, through the pretense of non-interference, to try and deter Western
criticisms.109 For this reason, China has largely been protected in the HRC and other
multilateral forums responsible for human rights oversight and political freedom.
Since China’s augmented engagements with the developing world, through
multilateralism, the CPC has similarly reinterpreted its policy of non-interference to
legitimize Chinese involvement in UN PKOs. The CPC initially rejected UN PKOs and
considered them to be an intrusion upon another state’s sovereignty, based on the
principle of non-interference and not impeding upon another nation’s domestic
affairs. However, since the growth of China’s multilateral foreign policy agenda, the
CPC now uses non-interference to justify its involvement in UN PKOs. UN PKOs are
justified through non-interference policy as long as a state invites the PKO into its
borders. As a result, China, for the first time in its history, volunteered PLA troops to
the UN PKO in Sudan (UNAMID) and in the 2011 and 2013, Beijing sent its first
combative troops to help in the South Sudan (UNMISS) and Mali (MINUSMA)
respectively.110
This policy change has alerted some to interpret China’s involvement in PKOs
with skepticism. Mali, Sudan, and South Sudan, are all states with close economic
ties to Beijing, have important raw materials that are exported to China, and have
large Chinese-funded infrastructure projects. Thus, these relationships could be
interpreted as China creeping towards the establishment of an empire (Chinese
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Imperialism) now that it has a legitimate way to send its armed forces abroad under
the pretext of non-interference and multilateralism. Others argue that there is a
Great Power Rivalry at play due to the fact that China, rather than Western states, is
increasingly represented in these operations and able to better coordinate efforts
and lead missions.111 Additionally, Strauss holds that PKOs are meant to uphold
peace and establish an environment in which development is more achievable. Thus,
despite whether China is involved in these operations to protect its own economic
interests, it is inherently attempting to bring stability to an unstable country. 112
Beijing has defended its actions in multilateral forums based on its policy of
non-interference. However, clearly there are different interpretations of the impact
of and motivations behind each policy. The disunity that emerges amongst research
from a single policy decision, such as China sending combative forces to Mali,
elucidates the complexity of Sino-African engagements and the inability to precisely
make all Sino-African engagements fit within the confines of one school of
interpretation. Rather, the complex nature of Chinese actions in Africa often
incorporates features prominent in all three interpretations.

Soft Power
Chinese soft power expansion into Africa can be better explained in a context
of non-interference policy. As a rising power, China seeks to spread its influence
where necessary but must also carefully act within the guidelines of noninterference. Consequently, soft power has provided Beijing with a means to exert
111
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its influence while still adhering to the 5 Principles. Soft power expansion has
primarily occurred in Chinese-funded media projects, Confucius Institutes, and
cultural exchange programs between China and its African counterparts. Because
African states allow China to exert this form of non-military power, Beijing can
legitimize its actions as respecting the sovereignty of a state while simultaneously
promoting a better understanding of Chinese ideals and cultural norms (noninterference policy).
Currently, soft power has been interpreted as contributing to all three
previously mentioned schools of interpreting Sino-African relations. Those arguing
that China is an imperial power state that China’s soft power, particularly through
media expansion and Confucius Institutes, is a form of cultural domination in which
the CPC seeks impose Chinese culture upon weaker African states. Adherents, such
as Kurlantzick, to the ideology that China is involved in a Great Power Rivalry, as
well as many of those who believe China is an emerging imperial power in Africa,
argue that Chinese soft power is a way to counter the West.113 Western media
outlets in Africa have been critical of Chinese engagements with African states,
especially authoritarian regimes with questionable human rights records. These
scholars believe that China, now the continent’s largest media investor particularly
through the state-run media outlet, Xinhua, is a way to push Western ideology out of
the continent and replace it with CPC propoganda. For instance, Xinhua will often
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work alongside its African counterparts and publish rhetorical articles in support
how Beijing interprets the status of Tibet, Taiwan, and the South China Sea.114
Conversely, many believe that China is benignly expanding its media
presence around the world and countering false Western accusations of imperialism
and neocolonialism. A number of independent media outlets and NGOs have
applauded Xinhua for providing media service infrastructure, many of which are
free, to Africans who would not have access to such information otherwise.
Moreover, Xinhua is sometimes perceived as being more reliable and providing
more transparent information than the states within which it operates, especially
hyper-corrupt states. 115
On the other hand, researchers who believe that Chinese soft power in Africa
relations is inherently good for development and mutually beneficial point to
various examples of Chinese initiatives that foster development. For instance, since
the 1960s China has sent medical teams to African states to transfer knowledge and
train personnel to better handle health crises.116 Moreover, China often grants large
sums of money to African universities that allow CIs to function and prosper.
Furthermore, China uses FOCAC to have cultural exchange programs with a majority
of African states. These exchange programs constitute venues where China and
African states can better understand the cultures of one another through displaying
artwork and other cultural practices.117
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Aid Without Conditions and Asymmetrical Trade Relations
China’s foreign aid policy states that there must not be conditions on aid
given to recipient states. In essence, the CPC does not attach conditions to the aid it
gives to African states. In the context of non-interference, China is abiding by this
principle by not putting conditions on the aid that it gives, regardless of whether the
aid is use irresponsibly by corrupt or violent leaders. Putting conditions on foreign
aid would violate Chinese non-interference policy because these political conditions
are meant to pressure and change the way a government governs, a principle
directly against non-interference policy. Thus, China is simply allowing recipient
governments to have the sovereignty to use the monetary aid as they see fit.
Shinn and Eisenman, 118 King, 119 Ramo, 120 Stauss, 121 and Foster et al. 122
interpret Sino-African relations as being motivated through purely economic means
with mutually beneficial ends. These researchers cite the fact that China’s policy of
aid without conditions provides fast and necessary aid to governments experiencing
instability or want to fund development projects. Moreover, Shinn and Eisenman
argue that Chinese-funded construction projects, in which one third of Chinesefunded construction projects outside of China are now based in Africa, engender
industrialization and technological transfers to lesser-developed states. Alden
further suggests that China may be emulating the ‘Flying Geese’ model of
development in Africa, acting as a developer similar to Japan in East Asia.123
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Conversely, Enuka,124 Nesbitt,125 and Thrall126 view Sino-African relations as
asymmetrical, in favor of China, and exploitative. These authors point to trade
imbalances and large debt payments, as a result of Chinese loans, that many African
states experience when economically engaging with Africa as well as the fact that
many Chinese small business owners in Africa undermine indigenous markets by
selling cheaper goods imported from China.

Moreover, Chinese arms sales to

African pariah regimes and militia groups, many of which circumvent Westernimposed sanctions regimes, further undermine African development. Finally, Mol
contends that China is pursuing a policy of exporting environmentally hazardous
production networks, from China to African states, thus exposing African people to
dangerous chemicals, polluting waterways, and destroying arable land.127
Although many of the instances that these authors cite, on both sides of the
Economic Engagement argument, are legitimate, clearly it is impossible to define all
Sino-African engagements into one school of interpretation, despite attempting to
do so within just one school of thought. However, if one more closely considers
these interactions in a context of China’s non-interference policy, it is easier to
understand that regardless of certain engagements being considered mutually
beneficial or exploitative, there is a underlying policy of non-interference which
China uses to justify its actions and researchers should use to explain why China
acted certain way.
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The issue of aid without conditions is used by researchers who argue that
China is benignly developing Africa, by those contending that China is exploitative,
and by scholars holding that China is involved in a Great Power Rivalry. However,
the diversity of interpretation within this topic can be better understood through
Beijing’s non-interference principle. Because China’s non-inference policy
constrains it from dictating how countries ought to spend their aid, China has the
ability to distance itself from the consequences of the aid. In other words, whether
the aid has positive or negative ramifications, China holds that it cannot tell a
country in what ways the aid must be spent. Therefore, if the aid is siphoned into the
hands of corrupt leaders, or if the aid is used to build crucial developmental
infrastructure, China can point to its policy of non-interference as legitimizing any
sort of aid given to African states. Thus, the recipient country is considered
responsible for determining the ‘best’ use of the aid. 128
By turn, it is impossible to define aid without conditions as being exclusively
mutually beneficial, exploitative, or fueling a Great Power Rivalry because the way
in which the aid is spent varies from state to state. For instance, a pariah regime may
use the funds to augment its military capabilities while a transparent government
may choose to invest the funds in education or expanding the country’s health
infrastructure. Some interpret Chinese aid to pariah regimes as fueling a Great
Power Rivalry as well. China is now the largest single aid donor to the African
continent and some, namely Ramo, believe that its ability to quickly send aid
resources to developing states is establishing an alternative to the Washington
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Consensus: the Beijing Consensus, in which human rights, good governance, and
democracy are not necessary for effective development.129
As Beijing continues to fund developmental projects throughout Africa, some
African elites are increasingly reliant on China to provide funds to solidify their rule.
This dependency model can be understood as a form of neocolonialism in which
certain states are so dependent on Chinese aid grants that they have little political
freedom to diverge from Beijing’s international policy agenda.130 Sudan, which is
isolated from much of the world as a result of a Western-imposed sanctions regime
is an example of a state that is so dependent upon Chinese aid grants, it has acted as
political safe haven for Beijing and constant source of raw materials, namely oil.
Moreover, by incorporating China’s non-interference policy to Chinesefavored trade imbalances, which are used by adherents of all three schools of
interpretation as evidence to support their claims, further prove that there is
significant overlap in Sino-African engagements that cannot be classified solely
within the confines of one school of thought. Beijing claims, based on its assurance
to not interference with the domestic politics of another country, that China is not
responsible for directing the economy of another country.131 Therefore, China does
not need to diversify the economy of another state or ensure that trade is balanced.
However, trade imbalances can be used as evidence to indicate a neocolonial
relationship, in which African states are increasingly dependent on Chinese exports
and investment in raw materials. On the other hand, it is possible to argue that trade
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imbalances exploit the fragile economies of African states, especially when a Chinese
merchants undermine indigenous production networks by providing cheap goods to
the market.132 Even more, some would suggest that trade imbalances are a natural
consequence of Sino-African relations, due to the overwhelming size of the Chinese
economy relative to its African counterparts, and any technological transfer is
beneficial despite trade deficits (mutual benefits). 133 Even Great Power Rivalry
adherents cite trade imbalances as making African states align with China over
Western states based on increased dependency from China.
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Evidently,

interpreting trade imbalances through a lens of non-interference proves that there
is significant overlap amongst all three schools of interpretation, highlighting the
complex and diverse nature of Sino-African relations and illustrating that Chinese
acts in Africa cannot be viewed exclusively within the confines of either
imperialistic, a Great Power Rivalry, or good or bad for development.

Concluding Remarks
Although Sino-African relations have been largely interpreted through the
lens of Chinese Imperialism, a Great Power Rivalry, or Economic Engagement,
China’s policy of non-interference provides a new, and useful, mode of explaining
Chinese engagements in Africa more broadly – one which takes China’s declared
policies seriously. However, whether declared principles are just rhetoric or reality
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can never be adjudicated by words alone. Actions must back up rhetoric. The
following chapter will empirically examine the degree to which China follows its
policy of non-interference when conducting foreign relations.
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Chapter 3:

An Evaluation of Chinese Non-Interference Policy: Taking China Seriously

Introduction and Findings
As Beijing increasingly expands its engagements with other states outside of
the East Asian region, understanding China’s intent in pursuing more robust
relations with other countries as well as the consequences of engaging with China
have become important topics of debate. The PRC publically, most recently through
its 2013 White Paper, holds that it strictly pursues “an independent foreign policy”
based on the 1955 Bandung Conference’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (5
Principles): mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, non-interference in each other’s affairs, equality and mutual benefits,
and peaceful coexistence. Beijing asserts that it has been consistent in abiding by
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this foreign policy doctrine, more commonly referred to as ‘non-interference
policy.’135
In the context of Sino-African relations, Chinese non-interference policy has
faced enhanced scrutiny by those who perceive the policy as a mechanism through
which Beijing can forge close relations with pariah states and circumvent Westernimposed sanctions on internationally condemned governments. Essentially, there is
a growing concern that China’s non-interference policy is not practiced in reality
and is simply used as propaganda by Beijing to maneuver itself into a position to
rival Western foes. Moreover, as China continues to bolster its relations with African
states, many scholars contend that Beijing’s non-interference policy will be
unsustainable as the CPC will be forced to choose between protecting its national
interests abroad or continuing to abide by a policy that is over half a century old.136
In contributing to this debate, this chapter seeks to determine the legitimacy
of the PRC’s assertion that it abides by this unique policy through its voting record
in the United Nations since 2000, the year in which China began vigorously
investing in African economies. This chapter outlines number of patterns in an
analysis of China’s votes in the UN, based on a full population of 1,217 UN
resolutions that I read, coded, categorized, and analyzed. It ultimately suggests that
China does, in fact, closely follow its non-interference policy based on the principle
of national sovereignty. The patterns of China’s UN voting record include:
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1) China abstaining from or voting against any draft resolution that would
attempt to encourage free and fair, democratic elections in a Member
State,
2) China rejecting the expansion of any UN monitoring or investigatory
mission in a Member State that lacks the consent of the Member State
that would be hosting the mission,
3) China abstaining from or voting against draft resolutions that would
invoke, or threatens to invoke, Article 41 of the United Nations Charter,
which gives the Security Council power to impose sanctions on
governments, organizations, and individuals,
4) China not supporting any resolution that would directly subject people to
the International Criminal Court (ICC) or criticizes the human rights of a
specific Member State,
5) China refusing to support any UN resolution that would force it to
decrease its weapons stockpiles, especially that of nuclear weapons,
6) China abstaining from any resolution that specifically refers to disputed
territories between two states,
7) China failing to support the acceptance of any potential Member State
that has diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan).
Nearly all Chinese abstentions or votes against a certain UN draft resolution, both in
the Security Council and in the General Assembly since 2000, fit within the confines
of these seven patterns (out of the 1,217 resolutions incorporated in this study).
Moreover, Chinese voting record patterns definitely illustrate its dedication to its
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non-interference policy. These patterns have serious implications for Chinese noninterference policy in Africa as Beijing and its African counterparts grow
increasingly closer. This chapter will first outline the methodology used to evaluate
Chinese non-interference policy, then briefly elaborate on each pattern from the
findings, and finally investigate how these patterns impact each school of thought
concerning Sino-African relations, ultimately giving greater validity to the
arguments that China is invested in a Great power Rivalry and is invested in a
mutually beneficial economic partnership with African states while undermining the
claim that China is an imperial power in Africa. Ultimately, this chapter shows that
non-interference can be used best to interpret, explain, and analyze Chinese
engagements with African states.

Methodology
Because Chinese non-interference policy is intimately connected with China’s
interpretation of sovereignty, in which China believes each state has the right to
wholly and legitimately determine its own policies without foreign influences
formulating that state’s policy, I sought to find a method to determine how
committed China is to its non-interference policy. However, given the secretive
nature of Chinese foreign policy, it was necessary to find data that could represent
Chinese desires. As such, I began collecting and examining UN voting records in the
Security Council, in which China is a P-5 Member State with veto powers, and the
General Assembly, in which China is one of 193 voting Member States. These two UN
bodies are the only organs within the UN system that draft and ultimately pass
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resolutions, of which only Security Council resolutions are legally binding whereas
General Assembly resolutions set international norms and standards that countries
should follow. The Security Council is composed of five permanent Member States
(P-5) and ten temporary states that serve two-year terms. Conversely, the General
Assembly is a plenary body where every UN Member State is present, all states have
one vote, and no states can exercise a veto. The concept of the UN is based upon
peaceful development and protecting the sovereignty of Member States. Thus, I was
able to build a database of Chinese votes since 2000 in both bodies and, from my
findings, determined the various patterns of Chinese policy as well as how close the
PRC follows its non-interference policy. The list of voting records starts in 2000 to
encompass China’s reengagement with African states that began at that time.
While collecting voting records on Security Council and General Assembly
resolutions and draft resolutions, I first compiled a list of every UN resolution that
was not passed unanimously in both the Security Council and the General Assembly
(a full population of 1,217 resolutions). I then noted each time China abstained from
or voted against a particular resolution in the Security Council and read through
each resolution or draft resolution to find patterns. The same technique was
employed for the General Assembly - I looked through each General Assembly
resolution that was not adopted unanimously, indicating that there was at least one
abstention or one vote against that particular resolution and took note of every
resolution China did not vote in favor of or abstained from a resolution. This
allowed me to begin to group similar resolutions together and find a number of clear
patterns. Finally, I coordinated my findings of Chinese votes in the Security Council
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with Chinese votes in the General Assembly and concluded that China, based on
these clear patterns, does strictly adhere to its policy of non-interference.

Chinese Votes in the UN and Implications for Non-Interference Policy
Pattern 1: Democratic Reforms and Free and Fair Elections
China has decisively rejected any potential resolution that calls for
democratic reforms as well as free and fair elections in a specific country. This
pattern is consistent with China’ s publically stated non-interference policy due to
the fact that the CPC is refusing to inject itself into influencing the political
governance structure of a state. Some key resolution topics advocating for
democratic reforms, all of which China vetoed in the Security Council, include:
calling for a democratic political transition in Syria,137 demanding that the Assad
regime allow all people to have the right to peacefully protest and establish
democratic governance,138 calling on the Syrian government to adopt democratic
reforms through the League of Arab States’ initiative,139 encouraging democratic
reforms in Zimbabwe,140 and advocating for democratic rule in Myanmar.141 In the
General Assembly, China has similarly been reluctant to support any draft resolution
that calls for democratic change in a Member State. For instance, China abstained
from efforts to promote and consolidate democracy around the world,142 as well as
abstaining from a number of other resolutions that specifically call on a state to
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democratize, such as promoting democracy in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo143 and investigating election flaws in Belarus.144 Interestingly, although China
does not support any draft resolution that propagates the establishment or
consolidation of democracy in a Member State, it does vote in favor of resolutions
that specifically reaffirm the democratic nature of the UN system.145
When applied to China’s non-interference policy, it is clear that this voting
pattern of rejecting the UN’s call for democratic reforms in a specific state, while
supporting general democratic norms in the UN, is inherently in line with noninterference. Generally, having a multilateral organization call upon a state to
change its domestic governance structure, whether for better or for worse, does
impede upon the sovereignty of that nation from China’s perspective. Therefore,
urging a state to adopt a new model of governing suggests that a number of states in
the UN want to influence and ultimately change some of the key domestic policies in
that state. Conversely, China’s support of democratic norms in the UN is acceptable
under its non-interference policy because no specific state is being coerced into
changing the structure of its government.
One key aspect of this pattern in Chinese voting records is that China is not
inherently against democracy; rather, the PRC rejects the attempts by the UN to
impose different forms of governance, whether democratic or nondemocratic, on a
Member State. This distinction is most apparent in China’s support for democracy in
the UN system. If China fully rejected democratic rule, one would assume that it
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would not have supported A/RES/63/189 and A/RES/63/167, which upholds the
democratic nature of the UN. However, China wants to have a say in the UN and the
democratic norms under which the UN governs itself do not directly impede upon
the sovereignty of a specific Member State.

Pattern 2: Expanding UN Monitoring Missions
A second pattern or ‘red line’ in China’s non-interference policy concerns the
role of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs). China is only supportive of PKOs when
the host country where the operation will take place supports the creation of that
PKO. However, China has rejected all attempts by the Security Council to expand
PKOs and monitoring missions without the consent of the host nation. For instance,
China supported the initial mandate of United Nations Mission in the Republic of
South Sudan (UNMISS) and has voted in favor of continuing to renew its mandate
each year. However, attempts to expand the operation beyond its initial mandate,
which was not approved by the South Sudanese government, were rejected by
Beijing. This is strong evidence that China supports the integrity of national
sovereignty over the interventions of international operations. It is important to
note that the Security Council is the only body that can establish PKOs and
monitoring missions in the UN. In voting, China abstained from authorizing the
expansion of the African Union (AU) mission in the Sudan146 and establishing an
international human rights monitoring group in South Sudan as a subsidiary body to
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UNMISS.147 Moreover, China additionally abstained from expanding UNMISS148 and
the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)149 while vetoing the
expansion of the United Nations Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)150 in
the former Yugoslavia. All of these resolutions and draft resolutions would have
expanded a UN PKO without the consent of the host country, illustrating China’s
commitment to respecting a country’s national sovereignty.
Even more, China’s refusal to support the expansion of UNMISS illustrates
that Beijing will adhere to its policy of non-interference even at times when its
national interests may not be furthered by it. Following the kidnapping of Chinese
workers from South Sudanese oil fields in 2012, UNMISS has been crucial in
ensuring the security of the extractive industry from militant violence. Thus, it is
surprising that China would vote against an expansion of this PKO given its growing
interests as an economic stakeholder in South Sudan. However, China respected the
South Sudanese’s desire to not expand the operation. Clearly, China’s noninterference policy can even trump its national interests abroad.
Although China rejected the expansion of various PKOs and monitoring
missions, China has supported the creation of these same PKOs. For instance, China
supported the creation of UNMISS, 151 UNAMID, 152 and UNPREDEP. 153 This
distinction is important because for a PKO to be established, a Member State must
allow the UN to enter its borders. In essence, although a PKO may take place in a
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certain state, China ensures that the state accepting the operation is in agreement
with it occurring within its borders. However, attempts in the UN to expand these
operations without the consent of the host state has been a point of contention for
China and it has not voted in favor of any resolution of this nature.
This pattern of only voting in favor of UN missions invited by the host
country is in line with Chinese non-interference policy. According to Beijing’s policy,
expanding a mission without the consent of the state where the mission will take
place is a clear violation of that state’s sovereignty. In other words, if a state does
not want international monitors or peacekeepers to work within its borders, China
sees this as directly undermining that states right to choose what happens within its
territory. Conversely, if a state openly invites a UN PKO or monitoring mission to
exist within its borders, China believes that the establishment of a certain mission is
not a violation of sovereignty due to the fact that the state appealed to the UN to
establish an operation.

Pattern 3: Article 41
Article 41 of the UN Charter mandates that the Security Council can impose
economic sanctions, embargoes, asset freezes, and travel bans. In essence, it is a tool
consisting of economic sanctions through which the international community can
punish states that are allegedly undermining international norms. However, China
has chosen not to vote in favor of any resolution that would invoke Article 41, or
even threaten to invoke Article 41, if a country fails to change its policies. Therefore,
China has abstained from a number of Security Council and General Assembly
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resolutions that have attempted to invoke, through the Security Council, or
threatens to invoke the use of Article 41 against a certain Member State. Some of the
topics of these resolutions include, but are not limited to, invoking asset freezes on
certain members of the Taliban government in Afghanistan,154 imposing economic
sanctions, an arms embargo, targeted asset freezes, and travel bans against the
Sudanese government,155 establishing individual asset freezes against the Libyan
government and military officials, 156 and enacting an arms embargo against
Eritrea.157
China’s decision to reject resolutions that reinforce the Security Council’s
ability to enact economic punishments through Article 41 illustrates China’s
devotion to its own policy of non-interference. Effectively China is depoliticizing
Article 41, contending that economic measures should not be a form of punishment
but should be carried out without regard to the political situation in a Member State.
Thus, Article 41 directly undermines Chinese non-interference policy because it is a
tool for the UN to punish a state, ultimately desiring to change that state’s policies.
However, coercing a state to alter its policies suggests that the UN is attempting to
have some sort of say in the politics of that country, thus intruding upon the
sovereignty of that state to pursue any policy it wishes. In effect, China has shown its
discontent with Article 41 and, in doing so, stays loyal to its non-interference policy.
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Pattern 4: Human rights and the ICC
Since 2000, China has not voted in favor of any UN resolution that specifically
targets a Member State’s human rights record or seeks to subject a Member State to
the International Criminal Court (ICC), of which China is not a member after
rejecting the Rome Statute.158 China is perhaps particularly sensitive about this topic
not only due to its allegedly poor record on human rights, but also based on the long
history of conflict between China and Western countries, especially the United
States, on this topic, in which some Western politicians, such as presidential hopeful
Hillary Clinton, have publically pressured Beijing to better its human rights record.
Moreover, in 2008 many human rights activists, outraged that Beijing was hosting
the Olympic games despite its human rights record, coined the Olympics as the
“blood games.”159
Nonetheless, when considering China’s voting record in the in the General
Assembly, China has abstained from human rights-based resolutions targeting the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 160 Turkmenistan, 161 the Islamic Republic of
Iran, 162 Syria, 163 and the former Yugoslavia. 164 Moreover, China has consistently
voted against General Assembly resolutions exclusively targeting human rights
abuses in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,165 Myanmar,166 Belarus,167
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Uzbekistan, 168 and Sudan. 169 In the Security Council, Beijing abstained from
establishing human rights monitoring missions and subjecting individuals to the ICC
in Sudan,170 Eritrea,171 and Libya172 while vetoing resolutions that would subject
Syria,173 Zimbabwe,174 and Myanmar175 to human rights monitors and the ICC.
It is interesting to note that China’s voting record in the UN on human rights
and the ICC closely resembles that of Pattern 1: Democratic Reforms and Free and
Fair Elections. As previously stated, China does not support resolutions that target a
specific state to promote democratic proliferation. However, the PRC supports
democratic norms within international forums. A similar pattern exists concerning
Chinese votes on human rights. This pattern suggests that Beijing rejects any
resolution that targets a specific country for alleged abuses while supporting broadbased human rights resolutions that do not target particular Member States and do
not result in substantive action being taken by the UN in reforming the domestic
laws of Member States. For instance, China voted in favor of having representative
geographic distribution of Member States in human rights bodies 176 and the
Optional Protocol of the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.177 The
latter of which does not call upon Member States to sign the document but merely
asks them to consider it. Moreover, there are no repercussions for choosing not to
adopt the Optional Protocol. Fundamentally, China only supports broad based
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human rights resolutions that do not attempt to pressure Member States into
changing their own domestic laws while rejecting resolutions that seek to monitor
and ultimately change the current status of human rights in a state.
This pattern very strictly resembles a compliance with Chinese noninterference policy. A major part of China’s foreign policy formulation is based upon
the notion that each state has a unique perception of human rights and it is unjust
for the UN to try and punish a state for its ‘abuses.’ China even rejects resolutions
that denounce the death penalty178 and honor killings179 because a resolution that
does so could result in the UN attempting to punish states that have laws allowing
for the death penalty, like the United States and China, or honor killings, like Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, and Syria. Therefore, China clearly views resolutions that seek to
punish a state or change a state’s domestic policy as interference. However, broad
human rights resolutions, in which no state is subject to scrutiny on its human rights
record, do not interfere with a state’s sovereignty and have been supported by
Beijing through its non-interference policy.

Pattern 5: Disarmament and Weapons Stockpiles
Disarmament, especially that of nuclear weapons stockpiles, is one of the
most visible policy issues within the UN system. In fact, the first resolution ever
passed in the General Assembly, A/RES/1/1, established a commission to deal with
the problems raised by the discovery of atomic weapons, illustrating the significance
of nuclear non-proliferation in the UN. However, China has decisively rejected
178
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resolutions that would pressure Beijing into eliminating or significantly decreasing
its nuclear arsenal. For example, China has abstained from any resolution that
advocates for the total elimination of nuclear weapons globally, 180 promotes
“reducing nuclear danger,”181 which includes nuclear disarmament and reducing
state’s readiness to use nuclear weapons, or enforces obligations under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for Member States to disarm their nuclear
stockpiles.182 In addition to rejecting attempts by the UN to disarm nuclear arsenals
around the world, China also abstained from additional resolutions that call for the
prohibition of mines183 and ballistic missile stockpile reductions.184
In terms of understanding Chinese non-interference policy, it is clear that
China’s voting on disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons stockpiles is
captured under non-interference policy. From the point of view of a Chinese
diplomat, states have the autonomy and sovereignty to build up their military
arsenals within their own borders. Thus, urging Member States to reduce or
eliminate their military stockpiles is an intrusion upon the sovereign right of that
state to pursue the policies it pleases. From nuclear weapons to mines and ballistic
missiles, China contends that there is no place for the UN to intrude upon a Member
State’s sovereignty and ultimately attempt to sway that state into reducing its
military capacity.
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Pattern 6: Disputed Territories
China has been very careful in abstaining from all resolutions that deals with
internationally disputed territories since 2000, including the legal status of these
territories and their peoples. For instance Beijing abstained from upholding the
territorial integrity of Ukraine, 185 determining the legal status of on internally
displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees in Abkhazia, Georgia,186 defining the status of
the Armenian occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan,187 and identifying
the territorial integrity of Cyprus,188 which is occupied by Turkey in its northern
regions. Although these resolutions are diverse in substance, for instance
A/RES/68/262 focuses on Ukraine’s territorial integrity while A/RES/64/296
focuses on IDPs and refugees, China continuously abstains from involving itself in
any aspect of these territorial disputes. Perhaps Beijing’s rational for doing so is
based on the fact that China struggles with its own territorial disputes, namely that
of Taiwan, Tibet, and the South China Sea. I will expand upon this idea in the
following section. China views its own territorial disputes as an internal problem, in
which Beijing refers to Taiwan as its ‘rogue province.’ As an internal issue falling
under the jurisdiction of a sovereign Chinese state, non-interference policy
promotes the ideal that it is not up to another state or the UN to get involved in
these disputes. Thus, China is following its own policy of non-interference by
abstaining from any resolution that deals with these territorial disputes.
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Abstaining from, rather than voting ‘no’ on these sensitive resolutions is
important because a negative vote could notion Chinese support for a certain state
that claims the disputed territory. For example, if China were to vote against
A/RES/68/262 on Ukraine’s territorial integrity, it may be interpreted as a sign of
support to Russia and its territorial aspirations in eastern Ukraine. Consequently,
China has followed its principle of non-interference by choosing not to become
involved in the affairs of disputed territories.

Pattern 7: Admission of States Supporting Taiwan
When compiling these data, I found that China abstained from S/RES/1290,
in which the Security Council recommends that Tuvalu be admitted as a Member
State into the UN. In order to explain this seemingly strange vote, it was necessary to
research older (pre-2000) votes on the admission of new states into the UN, in
which it became clear that that China has not supported the admission of any state
that recognizes the ROC instead of the PRC.189 This portion of research focuses
Chinese voting patterns concerning resolutions admitting both former UN Trust
Territories and aspiring UN Member States into UN. UN Trust Territories were
territories that were not yet self-governing states following the Third Wave of
Democratization and decolonization. Thus, the UN’s Trusteeship Council worked
with neighboring Member States to build the capacity of the Trust Territories with
the goal that these territories would eventually become independent states with a
seat in the UN. Given that there are no UN Trust Territories, the Trusteeship Council
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only convenes on an ad hoc basis. 190 After collecting data on whether these
territories recognized the PRC or ROC, it become clear that the ‘Taiwan issue’ does
inherently influence how China votes in the UN.
While it is not a former Trust Territory, Tuvalu was one of the last states to
be admitted into the UN. By focusing on former Tuvalu’s relations with the PRC and
ROC, China’s abstention from S/RES/1290 is much clearer. Tuvalu gained
independence from the UK in 1978 and subsequently recognized the ROC the
following year.191 As part of Beijing’s “One China” Policy, in which states who desire
to have diplomatic relations with the PRC must only recognize China and denounce
diplomatic relations with Taiwan, China was clearly dissatisfied with Tuvalu’s
decision to support the ROC. In fact, the ROC is the only nation that has a resident
embassy in Tuvalu.192 Thus, China’s decision to abstain from S/RES/1290, in which
it views Tuvalu’s relations with Taiwan as a violation of Beijing’s sovereignty and,
therefore, an interference with Chinese domestic policy, is much easier to
comprehend. China has followed this same pattern in many other votes on admitting
Member States into the UN.
Palau, a former Trust Territory that gained independence from the United
States in 1994, was granted a seat at the UN in the same year. After being admitted
into the UN, with Chinese backing, the country decided to forge diplomatic relations
with Taiwan in 1999, cutting off ties with the PRC.193 Similarly, the Marshall Islands
gained UN membership in 1991, with Chinese support, but did not recognize Taiwan
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“CIA World Factbook: Tuvalu”
192 Ibid
193 “CIA World Factbook: Palau”
190
191

65

until after 1998.194 In addition, the Solomon Islands were granted UN membership,
with support from Beijing, in 1978 but did not recognize Taiwan until 1983.195
Kiribati, which gained a seat at the UN in 1999 with China’s support, did not switch
its recognition from the PRC to the ROC until 2003.196 Similarly, Nauru also gained
UN membership in 1999, with China’s support, and later switched recognition from
the PRC to the ROC. In these cases, new states were admitted into the UN with
Chinese support and only switched their recognition to the ROC after being
admitted into the UN. More so, as a result of China’s One China policy, the states that
recognize the ROC have no official diplomatic ties with China. Perhaps these
previously aspirating UN Member States knew that Beijing would reject their
admission if they recognized Taiwan, which would explain why so many of these
states switched their recognition from the PRC to the ROC after being admitted into
the UN.
Papua New Guinea and Western Samoa, two former Trust Territories that
were administered by Australia and New Zealand respectively, now recognize the
PRC. Both Papua New Guinea and Western Samoa, because they were directly
administered by sovereign states, already had de facto recognition of the PRC
because their administering states held diplomatic relations with the PRC beginning
in 1972 (one year after it took the ROC’s seat in the UN).197 Thus, granting both
Papua New Guinea and Western Samoa UN membership in the 1975 gained Beijing’s
support because neither aspiring state recognized Taiwan and both nations were
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being administered by states that had full diplomatic relations with only the PRC.
Since independence and UN membership, both Papua New Guinea and Western
Samoa have only recognized the PRC. Micronesia similarly was granted a seat in the
UN with the support of the PRC in 1991 and has never recognized Taiwan as a
sovereign state.198
The admission of Bangladesh into the UN further shows the importance of
the Taiwan issue in formulating Beijing’s voting record. China vetoed S/10771 in
1972, which recommended to the General Assembly to admit Bangladesh into the
UN. However, Bangladesh had not yet recognized the PRC and did not until it was
officially admitted into the UN in 1975 (a simple majority in the General Assembly is
sufficient to admit new Member States). It appears that if states recognized Taiwan
prior to their UN bid, Beijing did not support their admission into the UN. This
pattern of rejecting the admission of states that recognize the ROC is directly related
to China’s policy of non-interference. Taiwan is perhaps the most sensitive
territorial disputed for the PRC and supporting Taiwan is, in effect, infringing upon
the sovereignty of Beijing in attempting to influence the affairs within its own
territories. Thus, Beijing rejects any notion of a state infringing upon its own
sovereignty defined by its interpretation of non-interference policy.
The seven patterns previously identified illustrate China’s dedication to its
policy of non-interference in the international arena. It appears that Beijing acts in
the UN with strict accordance to this policy to a point of predictability in how the
PRC will vote given a specific agenda item. Rather than arbitrarily voting for a
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resolution given current circumstances around the world, it appears that China is
more concerned with consistently staying true to its principle of non-interference.
Thus, a similar pattern has emerged in which Beijing only supports the admission of
states into the UN if they recognize the PRC instead of the ROC.

Chinese Voting Patterns Applied to Interpretations of Sino-African Relations
In assessing the various schools of interpreting Sino-African relations, the
aforementioned patterns I have established can be applied to each method of
interpretation (Chinese Imperialism, Great Power Rivalry, and Economic
Engagement), providing greater validation for some arguments while delegitimizing
others. Although many aspects of Chinese foreign policy are kept secret, as is the
case with nearly every state, China’s voting record in the Security Council and in the
General Assembly does provide a great deal of insight to the true nature of SinoAfrican affairs. The pro-imperial and neocolonial arguments are significantly
weakened when applied to the patterns within Chinese voting records. Conversely,
there is evidence in these patterns suggesting that there may be elements of a great
power rivalry when interpreting Sino-African relations.

Imperialism
These findings most clearly delegitimize the argument that China is a an
imperial power in Africa with the hope of establishing a modern empire, while
providing validation to the position that China is not, in fact, a rising imperial power
in Africa. As previously outlined, China appears to strictly adhere to its policy of
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non-interference, which is contradictory to empire-building. In other words, China’s
policy of non-interference is clearly defined in various PRC white papers, and
Beijing stays true to this ideology as discussed in the prior section. In short, Beijing’s
foreign policy rhetoric matches the actions it takes in reality. In turn, African leaders
continue to do business, forge agreements, and establish multilateral forums with
China. More importantly, in these multilateral Sino-African forums, such as FOCAC,
there is no one country that is granted disproportionate voting power. Rather, each
state is represented quite equally regardless of its size or geostrategic importance.
Thus, it would be difficult for one to argue that China is attempting to subject
African states to submit to Chinese influence and essentially become part of a SinoEmpire.
One can apply Pattern 2: Expanding UN Monitoring Missions to Sino-African
engagements to illustrate that accusing China of trying to establish a global empire
is farfetched. China’s rejection of expanding UN missions is entirely based on the
willingness of the host state to have an augmented operation within its borders.
Thus, China rejects undesired military intervention in a country and, therefore,
seems to not be involved in attempting to completely dominate African states to
establish an empire.

Great Power Rivalry
Based on my findings, there seems to be evidence supporting the possibility
that China is involved in a Great Power Rivalry against the West. Pattern 1:
Democratic Reforms and Free and Fair Elections can be applied to strengthen the
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argument of those who believe Chinese policy deliberately challenges the West. The
primary goal of the UN is to enforce and protect the sovereignty of its Member
States. However, promoting democratic governance and free and fair elections does
not necessarily protect the sovereignty of a state. Rather, it attempts to change a
state’s domestic governance structure to spread Western democratic forms of
governance. Therefore, Chinese efforts to curb governments, particularly Western
governments, from using the UN to promote democracy in particular states suggests
that there may be a Great Power Rivalry at play.
It is important to note that China’s voting record in the UN, in which is does
not support promoting democratic reforms in specific countries, can be used to
support advocates of the pro-Great Power Rivalry understanding of Sino-African
relations. However, one must remember that promoting any form of governance
would be a violation of Chinese non-interference policy. Unfortunately, there are no
UN resolutions promoting any other sort of governance, be it a monarchy, theocracy,
oligarchy, or one party rule, similar to China’s governance structure. If such a
resolution existed, it would be far easier to understand Chinese intentions. For
instance, if China supported a resolution that called upon a democratic Member
State to adopt governance reforms similar to the Chinese system, one would be able
to quickly realize that China is more concerned with promoting its brand of
governance around the world. However, if China rejected such a resolution, one
could readily conclude that China is more concerned with following its noninterference policy than fueling a Great Power Rivalry.
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Furthermore, Pattern 5: Disarmament and Weapons Stockpiles clearly
represents the possibility of Chinese involvement in a Great Power Rivalry. One key
element of Chinese global hegemony is the fact that the PRC has a nuclear arsenal,
large military, and long-range ballistic missile capabilities. China’s unwavering
position to protect its military capabilities, especially nuclear capabilities, from UN
scrutiny suggests that it wishes to continue to be a rising nuclear power. If Beijing
were to promote policies in the UN to disarm nuclear warheads across the globe,
one could more easily dismiss claims that China is involved in a Great Power Rivalry.
However, in order to militarily compete with other nuclear armed states, there is
more incentive for China to continue its nuclear weapons program just as many
Western powers do, including the US, UK, and France. Compromising China’s
military could, therefore, put China in a position in which Western states are
unmatched militarily.
Pattern 7: Admission of States Supporting Taiwan is also relevant in
evaluating the Great Power Rivalry assessment of Sino-African relations. Taiwan’s
close relationship with Western powers, especially its economic and military
relationship with the US, has been a point of contention for the PRC. Thus,
attempting to block nations that recognize Taiwan from gaining a seat at the UN
inherently weakens the position of those states that support the ROC. In other
words, by not supporting states that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, China is
undermining the position of states that believe the ROC should be an autonomous,
self-governing, state. It may be politically difficult for an aspiring state to feel it can
recognize Taiwan and, essentially, alienate itself from the PRC.
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Economic Engagement
There is a great deal of debate concerning the consequences of Chinese
economic interactions in Africa. Essentially, some scholars hold that Chinese
economic investments in Africa are neocolonial, exploitative, and heavily
imbalanced in favor of China, whereas opponents of this position contend that
Chinese economic actions in Africa are mostly mutually beneficial. Pattern 3: Article
41 can be applied to this ideological group, essentially aiding the mutual benefits
argument. By rejecting any notion of Article 41 in UN resolutions, China is
depoliticizing the international economic mechanism meant to punish states and
ultimately pressure them into policy reform. One would assume that China would be
able to dominate weaker African states, both politically and economically. However,
Chinese seems to be ‘leveling the playing field’ by taking politics out of economics
within the UN system. Thus, China is working towards economically engaging
African states in a more equal position rather than completely dominating African
economic policy prior to entering a country’s market.
However, despite the fact that China seems to be depoliticizing some aspects
of economic engagements through its rejection of Article 41, Chinese voting records
in the UN do not illustrate the specific consequences of China’s economic policy on
particular African states. Nonetheless, actively undermining Article 41 to more
equally engage with African economies may point to a desire by China to have a
mutually beneficial relationship with its African counterparts.
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Concluding Remarks
This chapter has shown that China’s policy of non-interference should be
taken seriously and treated as a legitimate foreign policy doctrine rather than
meaningless rhetoric or propaganda. Moreover, Beijing’s adherence to noninterference has serious implications for the major schools of thought on SinoAfrican relations. These findings undermine claims that China is a rising imperial
state or neocolonial power in Africa while given further legitimacy to the argument
that China is invested in a Great Power Rivalry against the West and the notion that
China is pursuing mutually beneficial relationships with African states. Although
these findings do not definitely indicate that one method of understanding SinoAfrican affairs is the ‘best,’ it does provide crucial insight concerning the strength of
each argument when contextualized in non-interference policy.
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Chapter 4:

Winners and Losers: African Mining and International Labor Standards

Introduction and Findings
The findings of this study are as follows:
1) Mining firms from developed countries and mining firms from developing
countries behave similarly in their adherence to international labor
standards while operating in Africa
2) Mining firms from developed states abide by ILO labor standards nearly
the same as mining firms from China; both have significantly less labor
violations than African and Canadian mining corporations while violating
more ILO labor standards than firms from the developing world199

199

The categorization of firms from the developing world excludes African and Chinese mining firms
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3) African mining corporations violate international labor standards far
more than Chinese, Canadian, and other mining firms from developing
nations
4) Chinese mining state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private Chinese
mining firms followed international labor standards equally

Introduction
The African extractive industry is the largest natural resource market in the
world, with the highest or second highest quantities of bauxite, cobalt, diamonds,
phosphate rocks, platinum-group metals, vermiculite, and zirconium in the world, as
well as containing an estimated 40% of global gold reserves. 200 As the world
recovers from the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis, the importance of and reliance
upon rare African natural resources is becoming significantly more essential to
global commodity production chains, including technological products, household
goods, electrical wiring, luxury goods, and nuclear energy. Most mineral excavation
and mine development on the continent now focuses on gold and diamond
exploration and, given the rising demand and prices of both resources, many African
states are facing an influx of revenue from the often lucrative mining industry.201
Much of the mining boom in Africa can be contributed to China’s need for resources
as major Chinese firms, such as Jiangxi Copper Company, redirect global mining
operations onto the African continent. However, the mineral extraction boom in
Africa has been geographically diverse rather than being limited to only one region.
200
201

Basov, 2015, par. 4
Idem, par. 6-7
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South Africa, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia, and the DRC continue to
dominate the African mining sector while the extractive industries in Angola, Sierra
Leone, Namibia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Botswana, and Gabon are
expanding at large rates.202
In the context of Sino-African relations, China is now Africa’s largest trading
partner, surpassing the US in 2009, primarily exporting natural resources from the
continent that are then used by Chinese manufacturers to produce goods that are
exported around the world or used to build infrastructure in China. Moreover, many
African countries, especially Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Sierra Leone, and Zambia,
are becoming increasingly reliant upon the mining sector to earn foreign currency,
such as the American dollar and Chinese yuan, to buy commodities on the global
market.

203

In fact, Sino-Zimbabwean mining relations have become so

interconnected that Zimbabwe became the first country in Africa to adopt the
Chinese yuan as its main form of domestic currency.204
Many researchers have emphasized potential consequences from the impact
of Chinese corporate engagements in Africa and whether China should be trusted as
a benign developer or exploitative, even neocolonial power. Much of the scrutiny
directed at Chinese corporations in Africa stems from a 2011 report by Human
Rights Watch (HRW) concerning Chinese labor standards in the Zambian copper
mines. The report accused the largest Chinese copper corporation in Zambia, China
Non-Ferrous Mining Corporation (CNMC), of deliberately violating the rights of

Basov, 2015, par. 14
Biesebroeck, 2005, p. 548
204 Idem, p. 553
202
203
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Zambian laborers through failing to implement proper health and safety standards,
punishing those who sought to practice their collective bargaining rights, and
discriminating against Zambian workers to favor Chinese managers. The report
titled, “You’ll Be Fired if You Refuse,” is provocative in its assessment of Chinese,
SOEs. However, the scope of the report and the subsequent claims by HRW must be
addressed. Nonetheless, the 2011 report has been cited by scholars including Yan
Hairong and Barry Sautman as well as appearing in numerous reputable
newspapers, such as the BBC, Time Magazine, and The New York Times, as conclusive
evidence that China is taking advantage of African miners. 205
The scope of the report, in which interviews were conducted with 193
miners in Zambia’s copper-producing districts between November 2010 and July
2011, placed greater scrutiny on Chinese firms as opposed to other foreign firms.
Nearly half (95) of the interviewees were from Chinese-run mines while only 48
were from non-Chinese foreign-run mines, despite the fact that China is neither
Zambia’s greatest import-export partner nor biggest investor in the copper industry.
Moreover, Zambia’s state-run mines were not included in the report and only seven
mining companies were evaluated in total, indicating that 48 interviewees were
distributed amongst the six non-Chinese firms, averaging 8 interviewees per
company as opposed to 95 interviewees working in Chinese mines. 206 The
remaining sectors of Zambia’s mining industry were not included in the report. The
report’s claim also attempts to make large-scale assumptions from the niche case
study upon which it relies. It suggests that Chinese corporations are not only acting
205
206
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against international labor regulations in Zambia but also allowing or being
complacent to other labor violations and malpractice despite the fact that the report
only focuses on seven copper mines in Zambia.207 It is important to note that
although it is preferable for mining companies to abide by international and
domestic regulations, in reality violations do occur.
As Chinese extractive corporations further deepen their ties with African
states, there is the potential for the debate concerning the nature of Sino-African
relations to ensue longer. This chapter seeks to determine the impact of Chinese
corporations in Africa and assess how these engagements should be understood in
the context of the leading interpretations of Sino-African relations, namely that of
Chinese Imperialism, a Great Power Rivalry, and Chinese Economic Engagements
with Africa. For instance, if both Western and Chinese mining firms are violating
labor standards significantly more than African extractive companies, this finding
may suggest that a Great Power Rivalry is at play in which the West and China are
deliberately undermining international labor regulations to be more profitable than
competitors. Conversely, if Chinese mining firms have significantly less labor
violations than African or other multinational mining companies, this finding could
indicate that China is not a neocolonial power but should be viewed as a benign
developer for African states. My findings show that Chinese mining firms in Africa
tend to behave very similarly to other foreign mining firms on the continent and
adhere to ILO mining standards better than African mining companies, indicating
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that China may not be a neocolonial power in Africa and that China and the West
may not be using Africa to wage a Great Power Rivalry.
The following section of this chapter will outline the methodology used in the
study, then evaluate the findings and what they mean for the major schools of
understanding Sino-African relations, and finally discuss the implications of these
findings to China’s non-interference policy in Africa.

Methodology
In evaluating corporate mining standards in Africa, it was essential to first
determine which labor standards to use in assessing these corporations. The most
inclusive labor organization is the Internationa Labour Organisation (ILO), which
includes 186 Member States as opposed to the 164 Member States within the World
Trade Organisation (WTO), allowing all UN Member States to join the organization.
Additionally, the ILO particularly specializes on international labor standards and
best practices to enforce these regulations. Moreover, China, as well as every African
country, is a member to the ILO. Within the ILO, which was created in 1919 as part
of the Treaty of Versailles, there are numerous conventions outlining labor
standards. 208 However, most states hold reservations to at least one of these
conventions, making the choice of which labor standards to use as a baseline for
corporate evaluation exceedingly difficult. Also due to the heterogeneous nature of
mining laws - there are 54 African states that all have different mining and labor
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laws – using the ILO was necessary to have some sort of common basis by which to
evaluate the diverse mining industry in Africa.
As a result, I found it to appropriate to use the 1998 ILO Declaration of
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (ILO Declaration from here forth) as a
baseline for this evaluation. The ILO Declaration adopts four universal rights to all
people, regardless of reservations that states may have to other international labor
conventions. The four categories of these universal rights are as follows:
1) Freedom of association and recognition of the right to collective bargain
2) Elimination of compulsory or forced labor
3) Abolition of child labor
4) Elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation
These four principles are significant in that they are also the longest standing
articles upon which the ILO was established; there are now a total of 19 additional
ILO articles since the organization's conception. Thus, each Member State to the ILO
joins that organization knowing that these are the fundamental values that the ILO
enforces.209
To constitute a labor violation, I deemed it necessary to find no less than
three different media stories or NGO reports citing the same alleged labor violation
by a specific mining firm. Violations ranged from labor strikes instigated by a lack of
safety and health standards, in which some firms were illegally mining without
permits, to reports that managers at mines were preventing workers from
practicing their collective bargaining rights and punishing those who attempted to
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do so. Conversely, I determined that a firm did not violate the chosen ILO standards
if there were no reports of these violations or if there were no less than two reports
commending the company for its close adherence to labor standards.
After establishing a basis against which different corporations were
evaluated, it was necessary to compile a list that best represented the major
extraction companies active in Africa, keeping in mind the geographic diversity of
where the companies have operations in Africa, total revenue flows, etc. Due to the
scope of this project, I chose to focus this study on the mining industry in Africa as a
result of the intense criticism Chinese mining companies have faced on the
continent in the past decade and especially within the past five years. Additionally,
the importance of mining to Beijing is clear in that by 2011, mining was the second
largest sector in terms of total global stock of Chinese outward FDI, totaling
US$66,995,370,000

of

aggregate

global

investment

out

of

a

total

of

US$424,780,670,000 in outward Chinese investments.210
There were a number of barriers in creating such as list. First, a lack of both
governmental transparency of SOEs as well as a lack of transparency from private
companies made it difficult to determine exactly which companies were active in
which parts of the continent as well as determining the revenue stream and political
prowess of the company. Moreover, the relative novelty, since the mid 2000s, of
Africa’s resource boom became increasingly apparent given the lack of legitimate
reporting on revenues, profits, and cost of operations. Underreporting or a failure to
report statistics on mining operations contributed to this problem. To overcome
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these hurdles, it was necessary to find the mining companies with the highest stock
IPO value and then complete extensive research on these companies to determine if
they have significant operations in Africa, which allowed for the creation of list of
the 50 most significant mining companies extracting resources from the continent.
I used the same method in creating a list of the 15 most significant Chinese
and Canadian mining companies, 20 most significant African mining companies, and
25 most significant mining companies from the West (see footnote below).211 Thus,
comparing Canadian and Chinese firms could prove to be useful in testing the
legitimacy of public assumptions concerning how closely both countries follow
labor standards. These lists could then be used in a comparative method to evaluate
if different firms act uniquely in regards to international labor standards in Africa’s
mining sector. For instance, it would be possible to determine if African mining
corporations adhere to ILO standards more than Chinese firms. From these lists I
could also determine which companies are SOEs and which companies are privately
owned, potentially indicating whether SOEs are more or less strict when following
international labor standards (see footnote below).212
After establishing a basis for evaluation and an adequate sample group from
which to test, it was essential to determine a universal way to assess each company.
211 The top 15 Canadian firms were included due to the public contrast that Canadian mining firms face in
comparison to that of Chinese mining companies. Canadian mining companies rarely face the same amount of
public scrutiny as Chinese firms and are often assumed to follow labor policies strictly. Thus, comparing
Canadian and Chinese firms could prove to be useful in testing the legitimacy of public assumptions concerning
how closely both countries follow labor standards.
212 It is important to note that given the relatively small sample size used in this study, accompanied by a general
lack of transparency in the mining industry, there is the potential for some selection bias in terms of reports in
African and foreign newspapers. However, in aggregate, the companies in this study constitute approximately
80% of the total mining revenue in Africa. This is significant insofar that the firms constitute such a large portion
of the mining sector in Africa that they are likely indicative, if not representative, of overall mining operations in
Africa.
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Most mining firms included international labor standards on their home websites
and ways in which they are promoting these standards, however, there was
ultimately no information on any malpractice and labor violations from these
companies (understandably so). Thus, newspapers, predominately local African
newspapers, became the primary source for evaluating whether a company had
violated the ILO Declaration. Without the ability to conduct fieldwork, widespread
interviews with laborers, and a lack of on-the-ground fieldwork from the ILO, there
is the ability for countries with a semi-free or closed press to hide some of the
violations that may have occurred. However, the list of companies from which I am
evaluating consists of the most significant mining firms in Africa, many of which are
some of the largest companies in the world; thus, NGOs and CSOs that monitor labor
rights also contained a great deal of information and field analysis of potential
violations. Therefore, local African newspapers and detailed reports from leading
mining and labor organizations, such as the Business and Human Rights Resource
Centre, were imperative in this evaluation.
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Implications of Findings for Sino-African Engagements
Finding 1: Mining firms from developed countries and mining firms from developing
countries behave similarly in their adherence to international labor standards while
operating in Africa
Firm

Country

Violation (Yes)

Violation (No)

Origin

Percent of Firms

Percent of Firms

with Violations

without
Violations

Developed

11

14

44%

56%

Developing

12

13

48%

52%

The fact that mining firms originating from both the developed and
developing world did not have significant differences in how they follow
international labor standards has a number of implications. When considering the
legitimacy behind a Great Power Rivalry from these data, at first glance, one may
argue that because there are few differences in labor violations between both
categorizations of companies then there certainly is not a Great Power Rivalry at
play. This assumption is based on the fact that it does not appear that one group is
actively violating more labor standards in an effort to undermine other powers.
However, I acknowledge that this finding could, in fact, support evidence that a
Great Power Rivalry may be at play. For instance, nearly half, a staggering number,
of the mining firms evaluated from both developed and developing states have
violated the ILO Declaration since 2000. This reality could suggest that perhaps both
developed and developing states are actively working to undermine one another,
thus explaining why such a high number of firms have violated ILO standards.
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However, it is also possible that these firms are seeking to maximize profits and ILO
standards decrease efficiency, thus decreasing profits. Therefore, mining firms in
Africa may intentionally attempt to circumvent ILO standards to cut expenditures
and maximize revenues. Although these data could potentially be used by pro-Great
Power Rivalry advocates and those who believe there is no Great Power Rivalry
occurring in Africa, illuminating the common struggle of how to interpret data on
Sino-African affairs. I believe the second finding, which is discussed on the following
page, is more conclusive in leading to the potential argument that a Great Power
Rivalry is not at play.
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Finding 2: Mining firms from the West abided by ILO labor nearly the same as mining
firms from China; both outperformed African and Canadian mining corporations while
being outperformed by firms from the developing world

Finding 3: African mining corporations violate international labor standards far more
than Chinese, Canadian, and other mining firms from developing nations

Firm country origin

Labor Violation

Labor

(Y=yes)

Violation

Percent of Firms with Violations

(N=no)
China

8

7

53.3%

Canada

9

6

60%

Africa

14

6

70%

Western (Europe and North

7

8

46.7%

3

7

30%

41

34

54.67%

America, excluding Canada)
Developing

Countries

(excluding China and Africa)
Total (75)

Due to the fact that labor standards from the top 15 mining firms from both
the West and China were almost identical, and the reality that Western and Chinese
mining firms performed better than any other categorization, except for that of
firms from developing states (excluding Africa and China), I am lead to believe that
these data have great significance for those who believe that China is neocolonial
power in Africa, exploiting African resources and laborers to benefit Beijing.
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Exploitation can be a biased and unclear term to define and even more difficult to
measure. However, using the percent of labor violations by African-based mining
firms as a basis for comparing Chinese labor violations, Africa being where the
alleged exploitation is occurring by Beijing, it is clear that Chinese firms are
adhering to ILO standards much more than African firms. Additionally, despite that
fact that Canadian mining firms face much less public criticism and are rarely
accused of intentionally exploiting laborers, Chinese mining firms were still able to
perform better than their Canadian counterparts. I hold that China, therefore, is not
an exploitative, neocolonial power in Africa based on this finding.
It is also important to keep in mind that given the strategic importance of the
mining industry for governments to secure precious resources as well as to generate
revenue, and considering the large scale of most mining companies, especially the
firms selected for this study, mining companies traditionally maintain close
relations with their home country’s government. Thus, governments may intervene
to protect their investments from foreign exploitation. For instance, research has
shown that both Beijing and Washington have been involved in promoting and
protecting Chinese and American mining companies respectively.213 This reality
may make it more difficult for a country to systematically exploit the mining sector
of another country.
One may argue that Canadian firms are perceived to behave well, in terms of
following labor standards, due to the fact that Canada’s press is free and both the
media and Canadian citizens closely monitor the activities of their country abroad.
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Thus, media outlets may feel less inclined to investigate potential labor violations
based on the assumption that if a violation were to occur, the Canadian free press
would immediately bring forth the problem. However, while a domestic audience is
important in checking and balancing the activities of firms invested in lucrative
industries, such as mining, and while China’s closed press may potentially allow
Chinese firms to avoid the same amount of scrutiny and oversight that Canadian
firms face, it has become popular for media outlets and Western NGOs to uncover
Chinese violations, as was the goal in the previously discussed Human Rights Watch
2011 report. Therefore, although a domestic audience with a free press can monitor
the actions of mining firms, the international, as well as African, media outlets and
Western NGOs have seemingly taken upon itself themselves to investigate and
attempt to uncover Chinese labor violations in Africa.
A second indication from these data is that an intentionally planned Great
Power Rivalry may be an illegitimate assumption concerning Chinese engagements
in Africa. One would assume that Western and Chinese mining firms, if a Great
Power Rivalry dictated Chinese policy in Africa, would be violating international
labor regulations more regularly than any other categorization. A Great Power
Rivalry suggests that global powers are actively working to undermine the
objectives of the other powers. However, Western-based and Chinese firms
essentially only performed worse than developing countries and also performed
better than the average of the firms included, appearing not to be invested in a
heated Great Power Rivalry.
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Finding 4: Chinese mining SOEs and private Chinese mining firms followed
international labor standards equally

Violation

SOE (n=10)

Private (n=5)

Y

N

Y

N

4

6

2

3

40%

60%

40%

60%

(Y=yes
N=no)
Chinese
Firms
Percent

This finding is perhaps the most applicable in determining the legitimacy
behind accusations that China is invested in a Great Power Rivalry as well as
assertions that China is a neocolonial power in Africa. As represented in the table
above, of the 15 most significant Chinese mining firms in Africa, ten are SOEs, which
makes sense given that 12 of China’s biggest companies are run and owned by the
state. In terms of a Great Power Rivalry, one would assume that companies owned
by the Chinese state, in which the CPC decides who will run the SOE, would reflect
the foreign policy objectives of the Chinese abroad. Thus, if China were involved in a
Great Power Rivalry, SOEs may be more willing to try and circumvent international
labor standards in an effort to increase efficiency against Western mining firms on
the continent, believing that they will be protected by the Chinese government. On
the other hand, SOEs may be advised by Beijing to follow labor laws as de facto
representatives of the Chinese state. Nonetheless, one would expect Chinese SOEs to
act differently than privately owned firms if a Great Power Rivalry was occurring.
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However, it appears that both Chinese SOEs and privately owned companies
are acting similarly in terms of respecting international labor standards. These data
also suggests that China should not be solely viewed as a neocolonial power in
Africa. Based on the data, it does not appear that the CPC is seeking to undermine
international labor regulations any more than the five largest Chinese private
mining firms operating throughout the continent. If Beijing were to be intentionally
attempting to exploit African countries and labor, one could assume that there
would be a major increase in the proportionality of violations by SOEs as opposed to
privately operated firms.
Additionally, these data have significant indications for the argument that
China may not be a neocolonial power in Africa. One would expect that if Beijing
were to be executing a plan to exploit the economies of African states, making them
dependent on China’s ‘know how’ for future success, then SOE’s adherence to
international labor standards would be different than that of privately run Chinese
companies. For instance, Chinese SOEs may feel protected by their government and
be more likely to ignore international labor standards. Conversely, there is the
possibility that Chinese SOEs may also adhere to international labor standards more
than privately owned firms in order to responsibly represent Beijing abroad.
However, because both Chinese SOEs and private mining firms followed labor
standards similarly, this reality suggests that Beijing may not be systematically
attempting to exploit African economies.
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Implications for Non-Interference
Investigating Chinese labor abuses in the African mining sector can also be
reinterpreted through non-interference. Non-interference, based on the 5 Principles
outlined in Chapter 2, which include having mutually beneficial relations with states
and peaceful coexistence, could be delegitimized if China was found to be
systematically taking advantage of African laborers and methodically violating labor
rights. Conversely, this study gives greater legitimacy to non-interference as an
actual policy doctrine insofar that China is not violating labor standards any more
than Western, developing, or African mining firms. Thus, through this evaluation on
the African mining industry, it is clear that China is still largely adhering to its policy
of non-interference.

Concluding Remarks
These data have attempted to better interpret the true nature of Sino-African
relations, primarily focusing on the complex and often lucrative mining sector.
Although there continues to be no conclusive evidence suggesting which method of
understanding Sino-African affairs is ‘correct,’ the findings in this paper do suggest
that China may not be invested in a Great Power Rivalry in Africa and that Beijing’s
actions in Africa should not be quickly dismissed as exploitative and neocolonial.
This empirical study and analysis hopes to set the tone for future research,
especially in finding ways to measure the impacts of Chinese interactions in Africa.
Furthermore, this study contributes to the legitimacy behind China’s noninterference policy and this policy, by turn, must be taken seriously. Nonetheless, as
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China continues to grow and Africa continues to export resources to world, the
resource scramble to claim and extract African resources will continue to persist
and, inevitably, Chinese corporations will continue to face public scrutiny.
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Chapter 5:
Conclusions and Further Research

Sino-African relations will continue to impact global power trends as China
continues to actively engage with African states. This thesis has contributed to the
debate concerning the nature of Sino-African affairs in a number of distinct ways.
First, the three dominant schools of understanding Chinese actions in Africa were
outlined and explained in-depth, they include: Chinese Imperialism, Great Power
Rivalry,

and

Economic

Engagement.

However,

the

flaws

within

these

categorizations, namely that of researchers treating them as mutually exclusive,
have resulted in the misinterpretation of evidence and researchers interpreting the
same evidence to argue in support of different schools of Sino-African thought.
Making evidence ‘fit’ within the confines of one school of thought is an overarching
issue in analyzing China-Africa area studies.
Perhaps the most provocative ideal this thesis raises is that Sino-African
relations can be best interpreted through China’s policy of non-interference.
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Chapter 3 has been useful in determining that China’s foreign policy principle of
non-interference must be taken seriously and should not be immediately denied by
speculative researchers. Furthermore, the fact that non-interference is a legitimate
foreign policy principle, to which China strictly adheres, raises questions concerning
the validity of the three main schools of Sino-African thought. For instance, if
Chinese non-interference policy is publically made, followed by Beijing, and
accepted by African states, it is more difficult to argue that China is an imperial
power in Africa.
One goal of this thesis was to also illustrate the importance of using empirical
data to evaluate the consequences of China’s relations with African states. Rather
than relying on predetermined assumptions about the nature of Chinese foreign
policy, these empirical studies were meant to show that one cannot simply dismiss
or accept the legitimacy of China’s publically made foreign policy principles until a
systematic study has been conducted to validate or delegitimize Chinese actions.
Future researchers should be cognizant of backing their claims with
empirical data and avoid making predetermined assumptions concerning Chinese
intentions in Africa. Although Sino-African area studies is a fairly new discipline, it
has the potential to be one of the most important areas of scholarship in
understanding international relations in the 21st century. Perhaps China’s robust
engagement with African states will usher in a new era of South-South cooperation,
in which Beijing can rival US global supremacy. Or, it may be true that the US and
China find common ground in Africa, considering that both powers have similar
goals of ensuring stability in the continent to foster economic development. If this
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assertion is true, China and the US may work more closely together, alleviating
growing tensions between the two powers. However, the consequences of a
potential Sino-American alliance in Africa in still unclear for both African
governments and African people themselves. Nonetheless, China’s engagement with
Africa must not be understated and should be closely studied, monitored, and
evaluated.
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